Pembina Institute Calls for Fairer, Higher British Columbia Carbon Tax (The Hook, A Tyee Blog, British Columbia)
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In British Columbia, a carbon tax wins popular support
In British Columbia, a carbon tax wins popular support (Canada Global Post)
British Columbia Premier Says NDP Plan to 'Axe the Tax' is Playing Politics
British Columbia Premier Says NDP Plan to ‘Axe the Tax’ is Playing Politics (CBCNews.ca)
Carbon Tax Guarantees Tax Cuts for British Columbians
The British Columbia Ministry of Finance issued this News Release on April 28. It speaks for itself and requires no comment from the Carbon Tax Center.
N E W S R E L E A S E
For Immediate Release Ministry of Finance
2008FIN0009-000615
April 28, 2008
CARBON TAX GUARANTEES TAX CUTS FOR BRITISH COLUMBIANS
VICTORIA — British Columbia is the first province to implement a comprehensive, revenue-neutral carbon tax – an initiative that returns every dollar raised to the people and businesses of British Columbia as tax cuts, Finance Minister Carole Taylor announced today.
“British Columbia is leading the way in addressing climate change, and the revenue-neutral carbon tax is another pioneering step forward for our province,” said Taylor. “Each step we take to change our habits and behaviours, as individuals and as a community, will help leave a legacy that our children and grandchildren can be proud of.”
By tying the carbon tax to reductions in personal and business taxes, the Province is giving the people of British Columbia the power to make their own choices.
“Pricing carbon sends a clear message that there is a cost to the environment involved in emitting carbon,” said Taylor. “Leading economists and scientists agree that introducing a revenue-neutral carbon tax is the right thing for our province, today and for the future. We took time to design a model that protects low-income families and moves British Columbia to being one of the lowest-taxing provinces in Canada.”
In the first three years, the carbon tax is estimated to generate $1,849 million in revenue, which will be returned to British Columbians as follows:
The bottom two personal income tax rates will be reduced for all British Columbians, resulting in a tax cut of two per cent in 2008, rising to five per cent in 2009 on the first $70,000 in earnings – with further reductions expected in 2010: $784 million.
Effective July 1, 2008, the general corporate income tax rate will be reduced to 11 per cent from 12 per cent – with further reductions planned to 10 per cent by 2011: $415 million.
Effective July 1, 2008, the small business tax rate will be reduced to 3.5 per cent from 4.5 per cent – with further reductions planned to 2.5 per cent by 2011): $255 million.
Beginning July 1, 2008, the new Climate Action Credit will provide lower-income British Columbians a payment of $100 per adult and $30 per child per year – increasing by five per cent in 2009 and possibly more in future years: $395 million.
Total tax cuts over three years:$1,849 million.
This groundbreaking legislation is supplemented by an immediate Climate Action Dividend, $100 for every man, woman and child in British Columbia. This dividend, which will further support our community’s ability to make greener choices, will go out to residents of British Columbia starting in late June.
For further information about the carbon tax and ideas for making greener choices, please visit:
http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2008/backgrounders/backgrounder_tax_impacts.htm
Media Contact
Finance Communications
Public Affairs Bureau
250 387-5013
For more information on government services or to subscribe to the Province’s news feeds using RSS, visit the Province’s website at www.gov.bc.ca.
Behind British Columbia's Carbon Tax
We reported last week that British Columbia will implement a carbon tax of $10 per metric ton of carbon on July 1, rising in $5/tonne annual increments to reach $30 in 2012.
In both scope and size, the tax leapfrogs North America’s other, modest carbon taxes, in Quebec and the City of Boulder, Colorado. How did the tax come about? CTC supporter Jurgen Hissen filed this account from Vancouver.
The idea for a carbon tax came from the top ranks of the BC government. It wasn’t foisted upon them. I think they were actively seeking ways to justify it to the citizenry.
BC Liberals — who aren’t connected to Canada’s national Liberal Party — have always been pro small-government. When they came into office in 2001, they cut taxes and government spending extensively. BC Liberals have also historically emphasized personal responsibility and environmental issues, and a carbon tax (a consumption tax) is pretty consistent with that.
After meeting last year with California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, BC Premier Gordon Campbell resolved to set carbon reduction targets for BC. Suggestions of a carbon tax began circulating, but the real push likely came from Carole Taylor, Campbell’s finance minister.
In late 2007, Taylor assembled a committee, the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services, to collect public input on the budget. The committee issued a questionnaire to every household in the province; how to tackle climate change covered three of the six questions, and two of them were what pollsters would call “leading”:
The Province currently provides tax incentives to encourage the purchase of hybrid vehicles [… etc.]. What tax changes would you make to encourage environmentally responsible choices? and
What tax changes would you make to discourage British Columbians from activities that contribute to greenhouse gas emissions?
Clearly, the government was looking to rationalize carbon taxes. The response was favorable, and crucial, not to mention broad-based. A carbon tax was backed by business leaders, a group of 60 economists from BC universities, and key religious leaders.
Taylor, the finance minister, reported getting 700 letters in support of a carbon tax (about 10 of those were mine, I think), and only about 160 opposed — a fact she cited on the day she announced the tax.
CTC invites readers from British Columbia or elsewhere to write with further details/insights on the development of BC’s carbon tax as well as potential implications for other provinces and the U.S.
Photo: Wikipedia
British Columbia Introduces Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax
British Columbia’s Finance Minister Carole Taylor introduced a revenue-neutral carbon tax today that will serve as an excellent model for the United States. According to a story in the Canadian Press, the carbon tax will be effective July 1, will be phased in over five years and will start at a rate of $10 per tonne of carbon emissions. It will rise $5 a year to $30 per ton by 2012. The carbon tax revenues will be returned to taxpayers through personal income and business income tax cuts, according to Taylor.
According to the same story, climate specialist Ian Bruce of the David Suzuki Foundation stated that "The Government has used the most powerful tool, a carbon tax, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions." As Bruce pointed out, "Green choices will become cheaper."
B.C. can now be proud of its natural beauty and its wise public policy designed to reduce the impact of climate change. Note that the proposed new carbon tax is very similar to the revenue-neutral, phased-in carbon tax proposed by the Carbon Tax Center.
For more on the new B.C. carbon tax, see stories at right under "Latest Headlines."
Photo: bfraz / flickr
Since climate progress is stalled, let’s unload on fee-and-dividend
Someone chose an inopportune time to beat up on carbon taxing’s fee-and-dividend variant. Not U-C Santa Barbara political scientist Mitto Mildenberger, whose paper, Limited impacts of carbon tax rebate programmes on public support for carbon pricing, co-authored with scholars from Montreal, Vancouver and Bern (Switzerland), appeared this week in the prestigious journal, Nature Climate Change. No, I mean iconoclast blogger David Roberts, who used Mildenberger’s provocative paper as a launching pad to again dunk on carbon pricing and people who still hold out hope for it.
Roberts’ post, Do dividends make carbon taxes more popular? Apparently not., published on Monday on his Volts platform, gets off on the wrong foot right away, claiming:
Economists have long insisted that pricing carbon is the most efficient way to reduce greenhouse gases. For years, they hijacked the climate discourse, with untold money and effort put behind proposals for various increasingly baroque pricing schemes, to very little effect. (emphasis added)
Roberts may be right about efficiency and economists, but his description doesn’t fit climate hawks like Citizens Climate Lobby and Carbon Tax Center. We place our chips on carbon taxes not on account of their economic efficiency but because of their unrivaled potential to slash carbon emissions quickly in the U.S. — and also their global portability.
The meat of Mildenberger’s paper and Roberts’ post, distilled in their respective titles, is that in the only two countries with some form of fee-and-dividend carbon pricing, not just public support but basic awareness of the programs, particularly the dividends themselves, is middling at best.
We think this “finding” is both questionable and beside the point. Let’s take a close look at each of those countries: Switzerland and Canada.
Switzerland

Official Swiss notice of this year’s carbon dividend. At the current 1.09 exchange rate, 88.20 CHF = $96.14.
Switzerland’s carbon tax began in 2008 and reached its current level of 96 Swiss francs per metric ton in 2018. Converting metrics and currencies, that equates to $95 per ton of CO2, the kind of level that carbon taxers dream about. According to CTC’s carbon tax model, if the U.S. next year started a $15/ton carbon tax and ramped it up to reach $95 in 2030, emissions in that year would be 33% less than in 2005, taking us 2/3 of the way to the Biden target of halving 2005 emissions in 2030.
Not only that, a U.S. carbon tax at the Swiss level of $95 a ton would generate a carbon dividend in 2030 of $1,500 per person, even allowing for reduced emissions and a larger population and equal shares for children. Surely, a $1,500 carbon check — or, if you prefer (and we do) 12 monthly carbon dividends of $125 per person — would translate into strong and rising popularity, especially considering that a majority of people and households would be expending less than those amounts in increased direct and indirect energy costs.
That’s the straw man. The reality is that Switzerland’s $95/ton (U.S.) carbon tax will deliver only $96 in per-person dividends for the entire year. (See document at left, downloadable here.) That’s less than one month’s worth of what U.S. residents would receive under a full fee-and-dividend scheme for a Swiss-level $95 carbon tax. In that light, it should be no surprise that Mildenberger and his co-authors didn’t find residents of Geneva or Zurich dancing in the streets over their carbon dividends. In U.S. terms, Swiss residents’ 2022 carbon tax dividend is what Americans would get in 2030 from a piddling carbon tax of $5.50 per ton of CO2.
Why the discrepancy? Why is Switzerland’s carbon dividend only 1/15 as great as what a U.S. dividend would be from a carbon fee of the same level?

Excerpt from Switzerland Federal Office for the Environment document, “The Swiss Approach to Carbon Pricing,” May 2021.
There are four big reasons. First, Switzerland’s energy consumption is far less per capita than that of the United States. Second, hydro-electricity rather than carbon-based fuels like coal and methane powers the country’s grid. Third, the Swiss carbon tax exempts transport and agriculture and more than half of Swiss industry (see graphic at right; full document here). Fourth, part of the tax revenue is siphoned off by businesses before the dividends get calculated.
No wonder, then, that Switzerland’s carbon dividend is so meager. Consider further that, as Mildenberger et al. point out, “Citizens receive their rebates as a discount on their health insurance premiums, with annual notifications about this monthly benefit through health insurance forms.”
Annual notifications through health insurance forms. This is reasonable, even enlightened, public policy. It’s also almost diabolically designed to obfuscate the dividend side of the carbon fee coin.
Canada
Canada’s carbon tax is far more complicated than Switzerland’s. When we last updated CTC’s Canada page, in March 2011, we characterized carbon pricing in the country’s 13 provinces as follows:
- Six provinces, including Ontario and Alberta, were covered by the federal pricing scheme that would reach $50/tonne in 2023 — around $36/ton in U.S. terms — and then ramp up sharply to $170/tonne by 2030.
- Four were deploying their own carbon tax, led by British Columbia, which inaugurated the Western Hemisphere’s first meaningful carbon tax in 2008.
- Quebec and Nova Scotia were part of a two-country carbon cap-and-trade program that is anchored by California.
- New Brunswick employed an output-based carbon pricing system.

Wording courtesy of UCSB Prof. Matto Mildenberger, lead author of the Nature Climate Journal article discussed here.
Given this patch-quilt, as well as the novelty of carbon pricing in most of Canada, it seems to us unsurprising that polling that commenced in February 2019 (and extended through May 2020, with five “waves” in all) would yield the mixed results reported in the Midenberger paper: upticks in two provinces, Ontario and British Columbia, and downturns in the other three, Quebec, Alberta and Saskatchewan.
The “core question” asked in the Canada polling, as described by lead author Mildenberger, who graciously shared it with us yesterday via email, is shown at left. The language is neutral, perhaps to a fault. It offered no affirmative spin, such as “Canada recently began taxing fossil fuels in order to protect the climate, with the money rebated in ways that will help households get ahead financially.” That kind of favorable tilt could perhaps be justified as necessary to counter the negative vibe surrounding taxation generally.
To be sure, that negative vibe is precisely what drives pundits like Roberts to deride carbon taxing, as he did in the second and third paragraphs of his post:
Over time, political experience with carbon taxes has highlighted a truth that should have been obvious long ago: carbon taxes are taxes, and people don’t like taxes. People don’t like paying more money for stuff.
More broadly, carbon taxes are an almost perfectly terrible policy from the perspective of political economy. They make costs visible to everyone, while the benefits are diffuse and indirect. They create many enemies, but have almost no support outside the climate movement itself. All the political intensity is with opponents.
We get it. We know full well the albatross that taxation always bears. But we also know that taxes on “bads” have been enacted into law. The U.S. government taxes cigarettes, as does every state. New York City taxes grocery bags, and Philadelphia and Berkeley, CA tax sugary soft drinks.
Obviously, taxing something as supercharged financially and culturally as fossil fuels is a much heavier lift, as evidenced by the absence of explicit carbon taxing anywhere in the fifty states. (We exclude federal and state motor fuel taxes, due to their tie-in to roads rather than health or climate; we also exclude New York State’s Petroleum Business Tax, though its support of NYC metro-area transit perhaps merits an honorable mention; conversely, New York City’s congestion pricing program, now scheduled to begin in 2023, will create a strong template for carbon taxing, as we’ve pointed out many times, including in The Nation magazine in 2019.)
So yes, carbon taxing — not fig-leaf $20/ton-and-no-higher carbon taxing a la Exxon or the occasional Republican, but a levy rising steadily to triple digits before 2030 — is hard stuff. But so is just about every other decarbonization policy or program, especially if done at scale.
Well-heeled NIMBY’s have whittled down wind projects for years; now, so too may supply-chain problems. Rooftop solar endures pushback not just from utilities and their high-wage unions but also from concerns that lower-income residents could gett stuck with higher utility bills. Only splinters of President Biden’s Build Back Better plan, which wasn’t going to be able to deliver its promised 50% cut in emission by 2030 anyway, will pass, thanks to one or two Democratic senators and 50 Republicans. Even the push to electrify everything may find its vaunted carbon benefits a good deal less potent than advocates imagine, an issue we intend to explore in a future post.

A record one-third of Americans in the latest “Global Warming’s Six Americas” are “alarmed” by climate change.
Still, though, the biggest misdirection in the Mildenberger et al. paper and the Roberts post may be their fretting over public opinion in the first place. The public doesn’t have to love carbon fee-and-dividend. It simply needs to embolden political leadership that will enact it (and the raft of complementary policies) into law and ensure that the fee, which shouldn’t be set too high to start, can keep rising over time.
Public opinion increasingly supports climate action, not tepidly but “with alarm,” as the latest Yale – George Mason opinion survey of “Global Warming’s Six Americas” attests (see graphic at right, and more detailed treatment with link here). It’s past time for carbon pricing naysayers to throw off their ideological blinders and get behind policies that can pass and deliver.
PS to David Roberts: Contrary to your Volts post, fee-and-dividend did not “los[e] badly in a public referendum in 2016.” What went down to defeat in Washington state was a sales tax swap of the carbon revenues, necessitated by the state’s constitutional prohibition against dividend-type state tax treatments. And what doomed the proposal was opposition from climate hawks who took umbrage at being leapfrogged politically, and in revenge brought in lefty heavy hitters to slime the measure. But that’s another story.
Huge hat tip to friend of CTC Drew Keeling for Swiss materials and perspective. Drew’s most recent Carbon Tax Center post, Rural disgruntlement, pro-climate complacency sink expansion of Swiss carbon tax, appeared in June 2021.
Where Carbon Is Taxed (Some Individual Countries)
This page reports on carbon taxes that have been enacted (and in one case, enacted and withdrawn) in:
Canada has its own page, where we summarize its nationwide carbon price and also report in detail on British Columbia’s carbon tax, the Western Hemisphere’s (if not the world’s) most comprehensive and transparent carbon tax.
European Union: Emissions Trading System
The European Union (EU) implemented a carbon cap-and-trade system in 2005. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the world’s first international emissions trading system, operating in all EU member countries plus Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein.
The EU ETS covers over 10,000 stationary emitters — mostly power stations and industrial plants. It also covers domestic and intra-EU air travel. In toto, the ETS covers around 40 percent of the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, making it the largest carbon cap-and-trade program in the world, covering approximately 1.5 billion metric tons of CO2 per year.
For much of its existence, the ETS was largely ineffectual because its emissions caps were too high and granted large numbers of free allowances to big polluters. Concern about carbon leakage — polluters from the EU potentially going elsewhere to do their polluting, hence, “leaking” carbon from the EU — drove the EU to implement free allowances as its primary method of allocation back in 2005. As a result, polluters obtained large numbers of allowances — in 2013, manufacturers received 80% of their allowances for free — and many were able to maintain a surplus.
Compounding the problem of giveaways, the EU grossly overestimated future CO2 emissions in setting the cap amounts, resulting in a too-high number of allowances. In the first phase of the EU ETS, from 2005-2007, only three member states had caps lower than baseline 2005 emissions levels. And with the 2008 financial crisis driving emissions down, the caps were rendered even more useless.
Background
In December 2019, the European Commission — the executive branch of the EU — introduced the European Green Deal, an ambitious climate policy package with the general goal of at least 50% GHG emissions reductions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050. The European Green Deal represents the EU’s main legislative effort to meet its commitments under the Paris Climate Agreement. The Green Deal included the ETS as an integral part of its action plan.
In 2020, the EU expanded to a 55% reduction its commitment to reduce emissions 40% from 1990 levels by 2030 and. The ramp-up came in December 2020, following all-night negotations in which the EU committed to helping coal-heavy countries like Poland meet individual-country commitments.
The U.K.’s concurrent exit from the EU and ETS caused a substantial exit of low-carbon power producers, resulting in an increase in average carbon contents for the remaining EU power producers. It’s not yet clear how these changes will play out, as the U.K. has not announced plans to link with any other carbon trading systems.
How the ETS Works
The European Trading System implements an emissions cap for the overall volume of GHG that may be emitted by covered airlines, power plants and factories. Emitting companies purchase at auction — or receive — tradable allowances, the total number of which is capped at a level that steadily decreases each year. Since 2013, the emissions cap has applied to the EU as a whole, not individual countries. The current cap for 2021 on GHG emissions from these stationary installations is 1.57 billion tonnes per year, or roughly half of 2019 CO2 emissions for the entire European Union, including the U.K.

Data from https://ember-climate.org/data/carbon-price-viewer/
The price of a carbon allowance has roughly doubled in the past several years, reaching a high of nearly €43 in March 2021. BloombergNEF (New Energy Finance) projects that prices will hit €100 by 2030. The higher price levels enable the ETA to “arguably serve its purpose by making it too expensive for emitters of fossil fuels to continue business as usual,” as reported in early 2021 by Alessandro Vitelli of Montel News.
Since January 2019, the EU ETS has included a market stability reserve (MSR), which maintains any surplus of allowances, allowing for adjustments to the supply of allowances up for auction, if needed. Unallocated allowances are transferred to the reserve, which is operated under strict rules that bar meddling by the Commission or Member States.
Phases
The ETS’s 15-year tenure to 2020 may be divided into three phases.
- Phase 1, from 2005-2007, served as a pilot of “learning by doing.” During that phase, about 12,000 installations received permits to emit about 2.2 billion tons of CO2, nearly half of EU CO2 emissions at that time. Most allowances were given for free.
- In Phase 2, 2008-2012, the cap on allowances was reduced by 6.5% compared to 2005. Phase 2 aligned with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, when countries in the EU ETS had to fulfill commitments to reduce emissions by an average of 5% below 1990 levels. (The EU and its member countries ended up cutting emissions by 8% below 1990 levels.) Several countries held auctions.
- Phase 3, 2013-present, saw the application of a single, EU-wide cap on emissions instead of the previous system of national caps. Auctioning replaced free allocation as the default method of allowance allocation. Phase 3 also brought more sectors and gases under the EU ETS umbrella. During this phase, the EU-wide cap on stationary installations decreased by 1.74% each year.
For Phase 4, from 2021-2030, the Commission revised and strengthened the EU ETS in 2018. The overall number of emission allowances will now decrease at an annual rate of 2.2%, instead of 1.74%. However, significant amounts of free allowances remain, ostensibly to combat carbon leakage. The EU will still give 100% free allocation to sectors at the highest risk of relocating production outside the EU. For industries less likely to flee, free allocation will be phased out, from a maximum of 30% in 2026 to zero by 2030. Overall, the EU predicts 6 billion free allowances will be granted from 2021-2030.
Impact
The EU ETS’s specific targets are to reduce GHG emissions by 21% between 2005 and 2020, and by 43% by 2030.
Total EU emissions of greenhouse gases fell by 23 percent from 1990 to 2018, according to the European Commission. Emissions from ETS sectors alone fell 33% from 2005-2019.
Carbon leakage
In its Green Deal statement, the European Commission addressed the concern that countries across the world will continue to have “differences in levels of ambition,” by pledging to propose a carbon border adjustment mechanism as an alternative to the ETS’s carbon-leakage measures. As Inside Climate News explains carbon border adjustments:
Economists have long suggested that there’s a way to break that global impasse [on climate action] — and that’s to treat carbon like any other international trade dispute. Impose tariffs or quotas on imports from countries that have given their manufacturers an unfair advantage of uncontrolled carbon emissions.
In March 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution favoring a carbon border adjustment mechanism. The European Commission will propose legislation in June 2021.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom — England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland — has maintained a carbon tax since 2013. Technically, the tax is a “carbon price floor” (CPF) that functions as the minimum price that fossil fuel producers pay for emitting CO2. The CPF applies to energy-intensive industries only and is not economy-wide.
There have been several calls lately to tax carbon emissions in the U.K. at a higher rate and on a broader scale. Grantham Institute researchers Josh Burke and Esin Serin argued in a fascinating Feb. 2021 opinion piece that carbon pricing should be enacted not as a stand-alone but “as part of a significant and broad package of post-COVID fiscal reforms.”
History
As a result of the 2008 Climate Change Act — passed with overwhelming support across parties — the U.K. was required to drastically reduce its carbon output according to five-year carbon budgets. Unsurprisingly, the U.K. — birthplace of classical economics and home base of Sir Nicholas Stern, the renowned economist who in 2007 famously called climate change “the result of the greatest market failure the world has seen” — turned to carbon pricing to carry part of the load.
In 2009, the Department of Energy and Climate Change released a report, “Carbon Valuation in UK Policy Appraisal: A Revised Approach,” detailing reasons to adopt a carbon price. Witnesses at the 2009-2010 Environmental Audit Committee’s report on Carbon Budgets called for a carbon price floor, but the Labour government opposed the idea. Then in 2010, the Coalition government consulted on proposals for a CPF, and the measure was introduced in the 2011 Budget for implementation in 2013. The 2011 Budget framed the CPF as a way to “drive investment in the low-carbon power sector” and “support the long-term stability of the public finances.” The government also said the CPF “achieves the right balance between encouraging investment without undermining the competitiveness of UK industry.”
When the carbon floor was introduced, the Confederation of British Industry and Renewables Energy Association were supportive, but the measure also found criticism from several sides that argued it was, by turns, ineffective, expensive, and uncertain for investors. But the government framed the tax as the best move for consumers, stating that the “market-based approach to pricing carbon provides the most efficient and cost-effective policy framework to meet our environmental goals.”

Data from U.K. Gov’t Energy Trends. Data exclude international aviation, shipping and emissions in producing imported goods.
Less than 10 years after implementing the CPF, the U.K. is halfway to meeting its goal of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. U.K. GHG emissions in 2020 were 51% below 1990 levels, putting the country mathematically on track to reach net zero by 2050.
30 Years of Falling Emissions
The first graph makes clear that this 2020 milestone is only slightly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2020 decline in emissions, though severe, roughly 40 million tonnes, was no greater than that in 2014 (also 40 million tonnes) and was less than the 56 million tonne drop in 2009, during the severe recession. Emissions fell in almost every year from 1990.

Data from Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy: Dataset for quarterly and monthly supply and consumption of electricity, Table 5.1.
The anticipated recovery from COVID-19 will, of course, provoke a partial rebound in emissions. The national government’s March 2021 Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy specifies that industrial emissions must fall by two-thirds before 2035 to enable the U.K. to meet its Dec. 2019 pledge — the first by a major economy in the world — to reach net-zero GHG emissions by 2050.
What accounts for the huge drop in U.K. greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 2019? Carbon Brief credits three changes for around 90% of the decline:
- Electricity that doesn’t rely on coal – 43% of electricity was generated by renewables in 2020 (“renewables” does not include nuclear power, but it does include wind, hydro, solar, and bioenergy).
- Cleaner industry and a shift away from carbon-intensive manufacturing.
- A pared-down, cleaner fossil fuel supply industry.
It’s important to note, however, that a considerable amount of U.K. “renewable” electricity is generated by burning biomass, i.e. wood pellets. Inclusion of bioenergy as a renewable source of energy is at best contentious and more likely a scam, as journalist Michael Grunwald pointed out in his March, 2019 expose in Politico.
U.K. Carbon Pricing: Details

Data from https://ember-climate.org/data/carbon-price-viewer/ and https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05927/
Initially priced at £16/tonne in 2013, the U.K.’s carbon price floor (CPF) was set to increase to every year, hitting £30/tonne by 2020 and £70/tonne in 2030, but was capped in 2015 at £18.08/tonne until 2021 (20.40 euros at the 2015 exchange rate). The CPF has impacted the generation fuel mix significantly; coals share fell from 41% in 2013 to less than 8% in 2017.
Brits sometimes call their CPF a “top up” tax since it was intended to top up European carbon pricing in the form of the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). The U.K. finished its Brexit transition from the EU at the end of 2020, creating the need for a new, non-EU emissions trading scheme (ETS).
The U.K. announced in February 2021 that it would launch its own carbon trading scheme in May 2021. The U.K. government says their ETS replaced the UK’s participation in the EU ETS as of January 1, 2021, but the first U.K. ETS emissions auctions will not begin until May 19, 2021.
According to Auctioning Regulations released in February, bids will follow a minimum Auction Reserve Price (ARP) of £22/tonne when they begin in May, but the price will increase: “The government will consult on its intent to withdraw the ARP as part of the planned consultation to appropriately align the U.K. ETS cap with a net zero trajectory which will be launched later this year.”

Data from https://ember-climate.org/data/carbon-price-viewer/ and https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05927/
The floor for the U.K. ETS was initially set to 15 pounds but raised to 22 pounds per tonne, perhaps following some form of the logic suggested by climate advocacy group Ember: “The EU ETS has averaged a price of around £22/t (€25/t) over the last two years, so it would make sense to set the U.K. carbon price floor to at least that level, especially with further reform to strengthen the EU ETS price due in the coming year.”
The U.K. government stated in the Autumn Budget 2017 that they were “confident that the Total Carbon Price, currently created by the combination of the EU Emissions Trading System [of 7.78] and the Carbon Price Support [of 20.40], is set at the right level, and will continue to target a similar total carbon price until unabated coal is no longer used.”
Ireland
(Thanks to Wesleyan University environmental studies major Nicholas J. Murphy for expanding this section in July 2015.)
Ireland enacted a carbon tax in 2010 under a coalition government of its Green Party, Fianna Fáil (one of Ireland’s two mainstay center-right parties) and the Progressive Democrats. Originally designed to provide a double dividend by offsetting income taxes, the revenue was re-allocated to satisfy the diktats of the Troika — the triumvirate of the European Commission (EC), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Central Bank (ECB) that administered the austerity policies on EU member nations bailed out during the 2008 debt crisis. (See OECD working paper on Ireland’s Carbon Tax and the Fiscal Crisis.)
The effect is arguably similar, since income taxes would have had to rise, absent the carbon tax revenues. Frank Convery, an economist at University College Dublin considered the foremost expert on Ireland’s carbon tax, writes enthusiastically:
Ireland is a pioneer in the implementation of a carbon tax. This has allowed us to avoid (more) increases in income tax which would have further reduced disposable income, increased labour costs and destroyed jobs. It is also facilitating us in meeting our very demanding legally binding obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and provides support for the creation of new jobs in improving energy efficiency and growing the low carbon economy.
Ireland’s carbon tax covers nearly all of the fossil fuels used by homes, offices, vehicles and farms, based on each fuel’s CO2 emissions. It began in 2010 at €15/ton and rose to €20/ton in 2012, where it remains today. Solid fuels (coal and peat) were added in 2013 at €10/ton after concerns from agricultural interests were resolved, and that price has since risen to match the €20 price on other fuels. The tax generates roughly €100 million in revenue per €5 of tax, meaning it currently draws about €400 million annually.
The carbon tax has been complemented by other environmental taxes based on vehicle fuel efficiency and domestic landfill waste, as New York Times environmental correspondent Elisabeth Rosenthal reported in Dec. 2012, in Carbon Taxes Make Ireland Even Greener:
Over the last three years, with its economy in tatters, Ireland embraced a novel strategy to help reduce its staggering deficit: charging households and businesses for the environmental damage they cause. The government imposed taxes on most of the fossil fuels used by homes, offices, vehicles and farms, based on each fuel’s carbon dioxide emissions, a move that immediately drove up prices for oil, natural gas and kerosene.
Household trash is weighed at the curb, and residents are billed for anything that is not being recycled. The Irish now pay purchase taxes on new cars and yearly registration fees that rise steeply in proportion to the vehicle’s emissions.
Environmentally and economically, the new taxes have delivered results. Long one of Europe’s highest per-capita producers of greenhouse gases, with levels nearing those of the United States, Ireland has seen its emissions drop more than 15 percent since 2008. Although much of that decline can be attributed to a recession, changes in behavior also played a major role, experts say, noting that the country’s emissions dropped 6.7 percent in 2011 even as the economy grew slightly.
Notably, the Irish carbon tax was designed to fill gaps left by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which addresses only large polluting firms and accounts for only roughly 40% of emissions sources while being hampered by volatility. The case of Ireland demonstrates the potential for EU-wide cooperation in setting an effective harmonized price on carbon in preference to a piecemeal and volatile ETS.
The elements of Ireland’s carbon tax introduced in 2010 are specified in the Finance Act of 2010. (See Part 3 (Customs and Excise), Chapters 1 (Oil), 2 (Natural Gas), and 3 (Solid Fuels) for tax rates and other provisions.)
Ireland’s Vehicle Registration Tax is also partly emissions-based. A VRT Calculator on the Irish Tax & Customs website provides a means to estimate the amount of tax on a vehicle based on Make/Model/CO2 Emissions. Interestingly, the CO2-sensitive VRT has touched off a pronounced shift to diesel vehicles, which emit less CO2 but more of other pollutants with localized health impacts. Changes to the tax rate in Budget 2013 are detailed here.
Finally, the law firm Arthur Cox offers these useful guides ([1] & [2]) to Ireland’s carbon tax.
Australia
The widespread wildfires devastating much of Australia in the Southern Hemisphere’s 2019-2020 summer have drawn worldwide news coverage and cast that country’s retrograde official climate stance in appropriately harsh light. CTC’s blog post, Australia’s Brief, Shining Carbon Tax distilled and updated the information below and also revealed the stunning detail that the two years in which Australia had a national carbon tax, 2012-2014, saw dramatic drops in CO2 emissions, both absolute and relative to GDP (see graphic directly below, at left). As of this mid-January writing, however, no other media had picked up this finding.
The Liberal Party government of PM Scott Morrison has come under withering attack for hewing to the climate-denying line of the Murdoch-dominated press that alternately blames the fires on arsonists and wildland “mismanagement” while hand-wringing that unilateral action to curb Australia’s emissions would have little or no discernible impact because the country accounts for only 1 percent of global CO2. The Daily Beast has reported that James Murdoch, the media baron’s younger son, was sharply critical of Fox News and News Corp’s “climate-change denial,” while Australian union organizer James Raynes posted the ironic tweet shown at right.
Our earlier coverage of Australia carbon taxing, though somewhat dated, is below. Be sure to read our Jan. 7 (2020) post.
Australia instituted a carbon tax on July 1, 2012 and repealed it two years later, on July 17, 2014. Both events were milestones. Though some countries, notably Sweden, have had longer-standing and stronger national carbon levies, Australia’s was the first explicit national tax on carbon emissions. The repeal was also precedent-setting, and predictably it has garnered far more global attention (and hand-wringing) than did the tax itself.
The tax level, $23 per tonne (metric ton), equated to $19.60 per U.S. ton of CO2, at the U.S.-Australian dollar exchange rate (1.00/0.94) in July 2014.
As recounted by Australian journalist Julia Baird in a 2014 NY Times op-ed, A Carbon Tax’s Ignoble End: Why Tony Abbott Axed Australia’s Carbon Tax, published a week after Australia’s Senate voted for repeal, the tax was a political stepchild, opposed by the country’s two major political parties, left-leaning Labor and center-right Liberal, and brokered by the Greens during a period of governmental stalemate in 2011-2012:
In 2010, the Labor prime minister, Julia Gillard, said she would look at carbon-pricing proposals, but also promised, “There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead.” Then, under pressure to form a minority government, she made a deal with the Greens and agreed to legislate a carbon price: a tax by any other name.
The heat, anger and vitriol directed at her as a leader — and as Australia’s first woman to be prime minister — coalesced around the promise and the tax. It grew strangely nasty: She was branded by a right-wing shockjock as “Ju-Liar,” a moniker she struggled to shake. The political cynicism surrounding the carbon tax certainly reduced Ms. Gillard’s political capital, but it was a perceived lack of conviction in the policy itself that damaged the pricing scheme’s credibility.
See also Australian ABC News’ superb Timeline of the tax’s torturous political path, posted in July 2014.
Predictably, the Times’ news dispatch, Environmentalists Decry Repeal of Australia’s Carbon Tax, cast the repeal as greens vs. economy, ignoring the reductions in carbon intensity in the power sector (which helped blunt the tax’s cost) as well as provisions that directed revenues to households to mitigate consumer impacts (see below).
Australia’s carbon tax also imposed climate-equivalent fees on methane, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons from aluminium smelting, and was collected from roughly 500 of the nation’s biggest emitters, according to the Big Pond Money blog. These included electricity generation, stationary energy producers, mining, business transport, waste and industrial processes; some (non-electric) industries were eligible to receive trade-exposure based assistance, according to the same source. Most if not all road transport fuel (i.e., petrol) was exempt. The tax level was indexed to inflation and rose from the initial $23.00 (Australian) per tonne to $24.15 per tonne in 2013 and $25.40 in 2014. Beginning July 1, 2015 the price was to be set by a cap-and-trade system linked to the EU ETS (whose price has fallen below $10/T CO2). PolitiFact Australia compared the size and breadth of its carbon tax with others around the world, neatly refuting the Liberal Party’s pejorative characterization of the tax as “the world’s largest.”
In May 2013, one of Australia’s major papers, the Age, reported that national electricity generation with highly polluting lignite coal had fallen 14% vs. the same year-earlier period in the tax’s inaugural nine months, with conventional coal-fired generation also falling, by nearly 5%. During the same period, renewable electric generation “soared” by 28% and electricity output from lower-carbon methane increased by 9.5%. While factors such as greater hydro-electricity availability, flooding of a major coal mine, and implementation of a 20% renewable-energy target probably contributed to the declines in coal use, the 2.4% reported drop in overall electricity generation suggests that the carbon tax played a part.
Overall, reported the Age in the same article, “the emissions intensity of the national electricity market has fallen 5.4 per cent since the carbon price was introduced [presumably over the nine months extending from July 2012 through March 2013], meaning carbon emissions from power generation is [sic] down 7.7 per cent, or 10 million tonnes, from the previous nine months.”
Similar statistics were reported earlier, in Jan. 2013, by “The Australian” newspaper. The “big change in the mix of power” was attributed to “much greater use of renewable energy from hydroelectricity from the Snowy Mountains and Tasmania, and also wind farms.” The same source also said that “The retreat of manufacturing has been a factor, with the closure of the Kurri Kurri aluminium smelter last year and cutbacks in other metals plants affecting industrial demand.” A consultant cited by The Australian added that “the spread of roof-top solar panels and of appliances that used less energy were reducing growth in household consumption” of electricity, while another consultant, pointing to reduced electricity generation and emissions, said that “changes of this scale are without precedent in the 120-year history of the electricity supply industry.”
According to “The Australian,” the power sector accounted for about half of Australia’s emissions and a larger share of the carbon tax, because some of the largest emitters have free permits.”
Use of the carbon tax revenues was complex. Some went to the Australian Renewable Energy Agency for project funding and other monies providing “a raft of other compensation and development funds focused on biodiversity, low carbon agriculture, small business grants and support for indigenous communities,” according to Big Pond Money. More than half of the revenue was said to be earmarked to support low and middle income households to cover the increase in prices that business will pass on to consumers. The government also acknowledged, according to Big Pond Money, that the carbon tax would take more from 3 million households than it would return, while 2 million households would be no worse off and 4 million households better off. A Household Assistance Estimator developed by the authorities was said to provide a means for families to estimate how they would fare financially under the carbon tax.
A later AP story hammered Australia’s carbon tax, asserting that “Voters have never stopped hating the tax and its effect on their electric bills” and predicting that it would doom the ruling Labor Party in the Sept. 8, 2013 elections. “Longtime Labor Party supporters — even people who have helped cut pollution by installing solar panels at home — have flocked to the opposition,” AP reported, in Australian Gov’t Faces Carbon Tax Backlash at Poll (Sept. 6, 2013). “The government estimated the tax would cost the average person less than AU$10 per week,” said AP, “but three months after it took effect, most Australians surveyed by policy think-tank Per Capita said it was costing them more than twice that much. But they also expressed confusion, with most blaming the tax for higher gas prices even though it is not levied on motor fuel purchases.” In an e-mail, cap-and-dividend proponent Peter Barnes blamed the tax’s unpopularity on the absence of “100% dividends, fully transparent and highly visible.” We don’t disagree.
Update (January 2015): In case anyone doubted the effectiveness of taxing carbon pollution, the following graph of power plant CO2 emissions published in Australia’s Guardian shows what has happened in the year since the tax was repealed. The vertical red line is the repeal date.
See also, Emissions for power sector jump as carbon tax ends (Sydney Morning Herald, 1/7/15).
Chile
In October 2014, Chile enacted the first climate pollution tax in South America. It’s a modest levy — a mere $5 per metric ton of CO2 — that applies to only 55% of emissions. Moreover, it doesn’t take effect until 2018. Still, it’s a positive first step. The NY Times reported these details:
Chile’s tax, which targets large factories and the electricity sector, will cover about 55 percent of the nation’s carbon emissions, according to Juan-Pablo Montero, a professor of economics at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, who informally advised the government in favor of the tax. At $5 per metric ton of carbon dioxide emitted, Chile’s tax is lower than the $8-per-metric-ton carbon price in the European Union’s carbon-trading system, which has often been criticized as too lax. But it is higher than a carbon tax introduced in Mexico in January.
“We all understand we need to go way beyond the $5 mark” in order to really reduce carbon emissions, Dr. Montero said. However, he added, “I think this still allows you to start building the institutions that you need in the future, when you start moving forward toward more ambitious goals.”
Chile’s tax was enacted as part of a broader tax reform and revenue measure, according to the Times:
Chile’s approval of a carbon tax owes much to its positioning inside a broader tax package, experts said. At the same time that it passed the carbon tax, the Chilean government raised corporate taxes substantially, in a bid to increase revenues for education and other projects. As a result, the carbon tax raised less debate within Chile than it might have otherwise, though electricity companies have objected.
Sweden
Sweden enacted a tax on carbon emissions in 1991. Currently, the tax is $150/T CO2, but no tax is applied to fuels used for electricity generation, and industries are required to pay only 50% of the tax (Johansson 2000). However, non-industrial consumers pay a separate tax on electricity. Fuels from renewable sources such as ethanol, methane, biofuels, peat, and waste are exempted (Osborn). As a result the tax led to heavy expansion of the use of biomass for heating and industry. The Swedish Ministry of Environment forecasted in 1997 that by 2000 the tax policy would have reduced CO2emissions in 2000 by 20 to 25% more than a conventional, regulatory-based policy package (Johansson 2000). On September 17, 2007, Sweden’s government announced that it will increase its carbon taxes to address climate change. Petrol prices will go up 17 öre per litre, with the increase in fuel tax calculated on the basis of a 6 öre tax increase per kilo of CO2 emitted. (The Local)
A new (July 2014) major report by the International Monetary Fund, “Getting Energy Prices Right,” briefly summarized Sweden’s carbon-fuels tax regime as follows:
In the early 1990s, Sweden introduced taxes on oil and natural gas to charge for carbon and (for oil) sulfur dioxide and on coal-related sulfur dioxide and industrial nitrogen oxide emissions. These reforms were part of a broader tax-shifting operation that also strengthened the value-added taxes while reducing taxes on labor and traditional energy taxes (on motor fuels and other oil products). (See Box 3.5, “Environmental Tax Shifting in Practice,” p. 41. The full report is behind a paywall and may be ordered via this link; Chapter 1 of the report, a summary, may be downloaded at no charge via this link.)
Sweden’s carbon tax history and current status were summarized intelligently in a 2013 blog post by “realmelo,” who appears to be a graduate student in economics in British Columbia. Click here for her/his useful, brief report.
Other Nations
(Note: See comment at bottom of page on the Vermont University Law School book, The Reality Of Carbon Taxes In The 21st Century.)
France has no carbon price outside of the implicit price from its participation in the European Union’s Emission Trading System. In April 2016, however, Ségolène Royal, Minister of Environment, Energy and the Sea, issued a four-page declaration calling for the nations of Europe to adopt “a carbon component in the energy tax” of €22/tonne in 2016, with a price trajectory of €56/tonne in 2020 and €100/tonne in 2030. Converting from euros (at the 1.14 exchange rate of 4-April-2016) and metric tons, the price schedule equates to $23/ton today, $58/ton in 2020 and $103/ton in 2030. She wrote:
This measure is essential to encourage energy efficiency and the development of renewable energy in the transport and construction sectors, which have the largest potential for investment and job creation. This change can be made by revising directive 2003/96/CE restructuring the communal taxation framework for energy products and electricity, which has remained unchanged for several years. It may also be undertaken by Member States individually. It should also be based on the principle of fiscal neutrality to avoid increasing mandatory contributions and instead favour the transfer of taxation to fossil fuels. The context is favourable because the drop in the price of hydrocarbons and gas is significant enough so that the carbon component will not result in increasing the final bill including all taxes for consumers (including motorists). Thus, the introduction of the carbon component preserves purchasing power over the short term, but gives a clear signal of the need to quickly carry out energy retrofitting on housing, purchase clean vehicles and develop renewable energy (especially renewable heat and biogas).
Minister Royal’s statement also urged EU member states to “work for the establishment of the carbon price outside the European Union and unite countries that choose to act.”
The goal is not to impose a single worldwide price or a world CO2 market, but to bring together all committed countries and companies around common principles: ensure the carbon price is within the range of between $10-20/tonne before 2020 and $30-80/tonne in 2030; remove subsidies for fossil fuels; prepare for price convergence through networked carbon markets or mechanisms for rebalancing competition such as carbon inclusion mechanisms. The alliance may rely on the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, on condition that it follows its road map and expands it to new countries.
Finland enacted a carbon tax in 1990, the first country to do so. While originally based only on carbon content, it was subsequently changed to a combination carbon/energy tax (U.S. EPA National Center for Environmental Economics). The current tax is €18.05 per tonne of CO2 (€66.2 per tonne of carbon) or $24.39 per tonne of CO2 ($89.39 per tonne of carbon) in U.S. dollars (using the August 17, 2007 exchange rate of USD 1.00= Euro 0.7405). Current taxes are summarized in a Ministry of the Environment fact sheet Environmentally Related Energy Taxation in Finland.
New Zealand made plans in 2005 to enact a carbon tax equivalent to $10.67 (of U.S.) per ton of carbon (based on conversion rate of USD 1.00 = NZD 0.71). The tax would have been revenue-neutral, with proceeds used to reduce other taxes (Hodgson 2005). However, a new government determined that the carbon tax would not cut emissions enough to justify the costs, and the tax was abandoned (Myer 2005). [CTC addendum: In Sept. 2007 the government unveiled a proposed emissions cap-and-trade scheme intended to cover all carbon emissions. The NZ Green Party’s preliminary assessment provides some details.]
Archived Supporters
This page is a catch-all repository of expressions of support for carbon taxes or other forms of carbon pricing by individuals who no longer occupy the positions of influence (as office-holders, editorial columnists, etc.) that they held at the time those statements appeared. For more current expressions, go to the individual pages (Public officials, Economists, Scientists, and so-forth) listed in the pull-down menu under Supporters.)
Public Officials
Former Energy Secretary Stephen Chu
In a February 2009 New York Times interview, Secretary Chu said “that while President Obama and Congressional Democratic leaders had endorsed a so-called cap-and-trade system to control global warming pollutants, there were alternatives that could emerge, including a tax on carbon emissions or a modified version of cap-and-trade.” Chu was one of four Nobel prize winners (he was awarded the Physics prize in 1997) to sign CTC’s Paris letter calling upon the UN climate negotiators to endorse national and global carbon taxes.
Paul Volcker, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, 1979-1987
Volcker, who died in 2019, was revered in the business and financial community for shepherding the U.S. economy out of the “stagflation” of the 1970s into the long-term boom of the 1980s and beyond, as chairman of the Federal Reserve under Presidents Carter and Reagan (1979-87). Speaking to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, earlier this year, he stated: “[The argument that taxes on oil or carbon emissions would ruin an economy is] fundamentally false. First of all, I don’t think [such a step] is going to have that much of an impact on the economy overall. Second of all, if you don’t do it, you can be sure that the economy will go down the drain in the next 30 years,” Volcker said. Referring to the new report by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Volcker added:
What may happen to the dollar, and what may happen to growth in China or whatever pale into insignificance compared with the question of what happens to this planet over the next 30 or 40 years if no action is taken… The scientists seem pretty well agreed that [global warming] is still potentially manageable if we act decisively, beginning now into the next decade or so, by taking measures that are technically and economically feasible.
(All quotes attributed to Mr. Volcker, above, are from an article published in the International Herald Tribune on Feb. 6, 2007, US: Economist Paul Volcker Says Steps to Curb Global Warming Would Not Devastate an Economy.)
Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL, 2001-2019)
Pope Francis’ June 2015 encyclical, calling for urgent action to equitably respond to the dangers of global warming and urging policies requiring polluters to pay for climate damage, prompted Senator Bill Nelson to speak out on the Senate floor. Nelson explained the need for a carbon tax whose revenue could be used to reduce other taxes that impede economic growth. (Video.)
Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT, 1981-2011)
Dodd anchored his 2007 presidential candidacy to a Corporate Carbon Tax. As he explained: “Until you deal with the issue of price, until you impose a corporate carbon tax, we will never get away from fossil fuels. It’s the only way this can be achieved. You have to advocate that if you’re serious about global warming.” (NY Times, 7/24/07.)
Bill Bradley (D-NJ, 1979-1997)
From Bradley’s op-ed, We Can Get Out of These Ruts, in the April 1, 2007 Washington Post (written a decade after he left the Senate):
We also need to change our tax system to reduce our oil dependence. In general, we ought to reduce taxes on things we need, such as wages, and raise taxes on whatever is dangerous to us, such as pollution and resource depletion. We could implement a $1 per gallon gasoline tax; or an equivalent carbon tax … After a few years of adjustment in the case of a gasoline or carbon tax, cars would be more fuel-efficient, so consumers would pay what they used to pay for the same amount of driving, and the broad middle class would continue to pay lower employment taxes. The result would be increasing demand for goods and services; shrinking dependency payments such as unemployment compensation and welfare; lowered social costs, such as crime and avoidable illness; and a more equitable tax system that encourages rising employment.
Congressman John Delaney (D-MD, 2013-2019)
On Earth Day 2015, Rep. John Delaney introduced a discussion draft of his “Tax Pollution, Not Profits Act” that would establish a tax of $30 per metric ton of carbon dioxide or carbon dioxide equivalent, increasing each subsequent year at 4% above the rate of general inflation. Delaney’s proposal would apply revenues to reduce the corporate tax rate to 28%, provide monthly payments to low-income and middle-class households, and fund job training, early retirement and health care benefits to coal workers.
Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA, 1975-2015)
Waxman, ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and co-author of the the American Clean Energy and Security Act, a cap-and-trade measure that passed the House in 2009 but failed in the Senate, began seeking public input on a proposal for a much simpler carbon tax in early 2013. With Republicans (many of whom are climate science denialists) wielding the gavel in the House, Waxman’s initiative made little headway. Nevertheless, Waxman’s shift appeared to bode well for efforts to enact simple, transparent carbon taxes without the gimmicks of complex cap, trade and offset schemes.
Congressman Bob Inglis (R-SC, 1993-1999, 2005-2011)
Inglis represented South Carolina’s 4th Congressional District for six terms before losing the 2010 Republican primary to a Tea-Party backed rival. With economist Arthur Laffer, Inglis published An Emissions Plan Conservatives Could Warm To (NY Times, 12/08), calling on Congress to enact a revenue-neutral U.S. carbon tax (emphasis added):
Conservatives don’t support tax increases that are veiled as “cap and trade” schemes for pollution permits. But offer us a tax swap, and we could become the new administration’s best allies on climate change.
A climate-change bill withered in Congress this summer because families don’t need an enormous, and hidden, tax increase. If the bill’s authors had instead proposed a simple carbon tax coupled with an equal, offsetting reduction in income taxes or payroll taxes, a dynamic new energy security policy could have taken root.
As long as national security risks aren’t factored into the cost of gasoline and as long as carbon dioxide can be emitted without penalty, oil will continue to have an advantage over emerging fuels in the marketplace, and we’ll continue our ruinous addiction to it. We need to impose a tax on the thing we want less of (carbon dioxide) and reduce taxes on the things we want more of (income and jobs). A carbon tax would attach the national security and environmental costs to carbon-based fuels like oil, causing the market to recognize the price of these negative externalities.
Conservatives do not have to agree that humans are causing climate change to recognize a sensible energy solution. All we need to assume is that burning less fossil fuels would be a good thing. Based on the current scientific consensus and the potential environmental benefits, it’s prudent to do what we can to reduce global carbon emissions. When you add the national security concerns, reducing our reliance on fossil fuels becomes a no-brainer.
It is essential … that any taxes on carbon emissions be accompanied by equal, pro-growth tax cuts. A carbon tax that isn’t accompanied by a reduction in other taxes is a nonstarter. Fiscal conservatives would gladly trade a carbon tax for a reduction in payroll or income taxes, but we can’t go along with an overall tax increase.
The good news is that both Democrats and Republicans could support a carbon tax offset by a payroll or income tax cut.
Two carbon tax bills introduced in House Ways & Means (tax-writing committee) embodied much of what Rep. Inglis advocated in his op-ed: Stark-McDermott, filed in April 2007, and Larson, filed in August. (More details on our Bills page.) Rep. Inglis now chairs republicEn, (formerly the Energy & Enterprise Initiative at George Mason University) and is a vocal advocate for a revenue-neutral U.S.carbon tax.
Congressman Pete Stark (D-CA, 1973-2013) and Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA, 1989-2017)
(Former) Congressmen Stark, who died in 2020, and McDermott were lead sponsors of the “Save Our Climate Act,” (2007) that would have imposed a $10 per ton (of carbon) charge on coal, petroleum and natural gas when the fuel is either extracted or imported. The charge would increase by $10 every year until U.S. carbon dioxide emissions have dropped 80% from 1990 levels. Introducing the bill, Congressman Stark eloquently stated:
The question is not if human activity is responsible for global climate change, but how the United States will respond,” said Stark. “Predictable, transparent and universal, a carbon tax is a simple solution to a difficult problem. It would drastically reduce our carbon dioxide emissions by providing an economic disincentive for the use of carbon-based fossil fuels and an incentive for the development and use of cleaner alternative energies. The Save Our Climate Act would establish the United States as a global leader in environmental protection and encourage other nations – most of whom have already acknowledged the climate change threat – to take similar action to reduce emissions. I strongly encourage Congress to pass a carbon tax.
CTC reported on the Stark-McDermott bill here.
Editorial Positions
The New York Times
See our Editorial Positions page for more recent expressions.
Global Warming and Your Wallet (July 6, 2007): “When the market, on its own, fails to arrive at the proper price for goods and services, it’s the job of government to correct the failure… We are now using the atmosphere as a free dumping ground for carbon emissions. Unless we — industry and consumers — are made to pay a significant price for doing so, we will never get anywhere.”
Warming Up on Capitol Hill (March 25, 2007): “Forcing polluters to, in effect, pay a fee for every ton of carbon dioxide they emit will create powerful incentives for developing and deploying cleaner technologies.”
The Truth About Coal (Feb. 25, 2007): “There is a need to put a price on carbon to force companies to abandon older, dirtier technologies for newer, cleaner ones. Right now, everyone is using the atmosphere like a municipal dump, depositing carbon dioxide free. Start charging for the privilege and people will find smarter ways to do business. A carbon tax is one approach. Another is to impose a steadily decreasing cap on emissions and let individual companies figure out ways to stay below the cap.”
Avoiding Calamity on the Cheap (Nov. 3, 2006): “Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, the atmosphere has served as a free dumping ground for carbon gases. If people and industries are made to pay heavily for the privilege, they will inevitably be driven to develop cleaner fuels, cars and factories.”
The Washington Post
See our Editorial Positions page for more recent expressions.
Some Positive Energy — Now Start Talking About a Carbon Tax, (June 25, 2007).
As important as many of the measures in [the Senate energy] bill are, they amount to only tinkering at the margins of a serious problem. What the Senate bill doesn’t do — and what the House bill won’t do when it is brought to the floor for consideration next month — is spark a necessary debate on the imposition of a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. This must be on the agenda after the Fourth of July recess when the Senate is expected to take up global warming. Sooner or later, Congress will have to realize that slapping a price on carbon emissions and then getting out of the way to let the market decide how best to deal with it is the wisest course of action.
Sorry Record – Waiting for breakthrough technologies is not the way to reduce greenhouse gases (July 11, 2006)
[The Administration] has resisted taxing carbon use, preferring instead to provide incentives for oil and gas extraction — just the opposite of what’s needed.
Los Angeles Times
See our Editorial Positions page for more recent expressions.
The L.A. Times ran two stirring editorials in May-June 2007 that powerfully made the case for taxing carbon. Here are excerpts:
Time to Tax Carbon, (May 28, 2007):
There is a growing consensus among economists around the world that a carbon tax is the best way to combat global warming, and there are prominent backers across the political spectrum … Yet the political consensus is going in a very different direction. European leaders are pushing hard for the United States and other countries to join their failed carbon-trading scheme, and there are no fewer than five bills before Congress that would impose a federal cap-and-trade system. On the other side, there is just one lonely bill in the House, from Rep. Pete Stark (D-Fremont), to impose a carbon tax, and it’s not expected to go far.
The obvious reason is that, for voters, taxes are radioactive, while carbon trading sounds like something that just affects utilities and big corporations. The many green politicians stumping for cap-and-trade seldom point out that such a system would result in higher and less predictable power bills. Ironically, even though a carbon tax could cost voters less, cap-and-trade is being sold as the more consumer-friendly approach.
A well-designed, well-monitored carbon-trading scheme could deeply reduce greenhouse gases with less economic damage than pure regulation. But it’s not the best way, and it is so complex that it would probably take many years to iron out all the wrinkles. Voters might well embrace carbon taxes if political leaders were more honest about the comparative costs.
Reinveting Kyoto, (June 11, 2007):
A better treaty [than Kyoto] would scrap the unworkable carbon-trading scheme and instead impose new taxes on carbon-based fuels. As recently explained in the first installment of this series [Time to Tax Carbon, above], carbon taxes avoid many of the pitfalls of carbon trading. They would produce an equal incentive for every nation to clean up without relying on arbitrary dates or caps, or transferring money from one nation to another. They’re also much less subject to corruption because they give governments an incentive to monitor and crack down on polluters (the tax money goes to the government, so the government wins by keeping polluters honest)… Real solutions to global warming, such as carbon taxes, won’t come cheap — they’ll make power bills steeper and gas prices even higher than they are now. But the economic news isn’t all bad. Much of the clean technology of the future will probably be developed in the United States and sold overseas. Think of [a carbon tax] as a novel way of reducing our trade deficit with China while building a cleaner world.“
For the strong critique of cap-and-trade in the Time to Tax Carbon editorial, click here.
Other Newspapers
Detroit Free Press:
A tax on carbon dioxide emissions, phased in gradually but relentlessly, would be the most transparent and efficient step this country could take in the search for energy independence and reductions in many emissions, including carbon dioxide. It would send a hugely important signal to the markets — for cars and for alternative energy sources such as windmills and solar collectors, in particular — that innovation and conservation are essential. Consumers are going to pay for any measures taken to reduce greenhouse gases and shift away from dependence on foreign petroleum. But most politicians choose instead to hide the costs by placing expensive demands on automakers and by dispensing subsidies for alternative fuels, such as ethanol, that become a hidden tax burden. A cap-and-trade system for emissions also would have disguised costs. Keep Carbon Tax in the Mix of Solutions, July 12, 2007.
Chicago Tribune:
[T]he ultimate goal should not be to reduce the price consumers pay at the pump. It should be to reduce the amount going to oil producers. Global warming is more than ample grounds for levying taxes on carbon-based fuels, including gasoline, to reduce emissions. But those taxes would fall partly on foreign oil producers. By cutting consumption, they promise to put downward pressure on world crude oil prices—weakening OPEC and stemming the flow of dollars to anti-American regimes. American consumers have a choice: They can pay high prices to oil producers or to themselves. The tax proceeds can be used to finance programs of value here at home or to pay for cuts in other taxes—even as they curb the release of carbon dioxide. Pump Pain, May 20, 2008.
Christian Science Monitor:
Consumption taxes, after all, are often designed to wean people off bad behavior, such as smoking. A 90 percent drop in these emissions is probably what’s needed to limit any rise in atmospheric warming to 2 degrees Celsius, a goal that many scientists recommend. Most presidential candidates do endorse pinching pocketbooks, but only indirectly, such as by calling for higher fuel efficiency in vehicles and a cap on greenhouse-gas pollution from company smokestacks. Such demands on industry have the advantage of creating more certainty in reducing emissions, but they are complex to enforce. Gore would do both: tax carbon use and cap emissions. Putting a crimp on global warming can’t be done solely by promoting new energy technologies and voluntary conservation. Consumers of oil and coal need a direct tax shock. Christian Science Monitor, July 5, 2007.
The Monitor was even more direct in a pair of editorials on Oct. 25 and 26. In the first, Be Wary of Complex Carbon Caps, the Monitor noted the loopholes, fraud and other problems that have hamstrung carbon cap-and-trade programs. In the second, A Tax on Carbon to Cool the Planet, the Monitor summarized the first editorial:
Indeed, caps may put the US on a knowable track to, say, an 80 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2050. But as the previous Monitor’s View pointed out, the flaws in cap-and-trade plans as experienced in other nations – their complexity and vulnerability to fraud and special-interest lobbyists – would reduce the intended effect. They also take a long time to set up and get working right. And, in the end, they also raise energy prices for consumers, just not as directly as a tax.
The Monitor then concluded:
With Europe’s cap-and-trade system faltering, the US should be a leader in using a carbon tax, even if big polluters such as China don’t follow. As a last resort, the US could tax goods from countries that fail to cut their carbon emissions.
A carbon tax is not the whole solution. Regulations will still be needed, such as stiffer fuel-economy standards for cars and trucks. And the US should fund research into alternative fuels, too. All it takes is the political will to act.
Eugene (OR) Register-Guard:
The crisis presented by global warming demands a response that is simple, comprehensive and effective. A tax on carbon consumption is the only response in sight that both discourages the production of emissions that cause global warming, and finances the rapid transition to a post-carbon economy… “The best way to tax carbon fuels is at the point of production: at the wellhead, mine or biofuel plant. The added tax should be large – starting at the equivalent of $1 per gallon of gasoline, and increasing to the equivalent of $6 per gallon of gasoline over 10 years… The phase-in of high taxes on carbon fuels over 10 years will provide huge incentives for market-financed, market-driven, market-governed development of unsubsidized, safe, sustainable alternate energy sources, far more efficient uses of energy, and other alternate products and methods. (The Cold Truth, July 22, 2007).
Writers & Pundits
Bob Herbert
Writing about Obama’s tepid response to the BP oil disaster in the Gulf Coast, Herbert wrote on June 1, 2010:
[W]henever the well gets capped, what we really need is leadership that calls on the American public to begin coping in a serious and sustained way with an energy crisis that we’ve been warned about for decades. If the worst environmental disaster in the country’s history is not enough to bring about a reversal of our epic foolishness on the energy front, then nothing will.
The first thing we can do is conserve more. That’s the low-hanging fruit in any clean-energy strategy. It’s fast, cheap and easy. It’s something that all Americans, young and old, can be asked to participate in immediately. In that sense, it’s a way of combating the pervasive feelings of helplessness that have become so demoralizing and so destructive to our long-term interests…
We also need a carbon tax. The current crisis is the perfect opportunity for our political leaders to explain to the public why this is so important and what benefits would come from it. (Our Epic Foolishness, June 1, 2010, emphasis added).
John Tierney
Burn, Baby, Burn (“The fairest and most efficient way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would be with a carbon tax on all fossil fuels,” Feb. 7, 2006; similarly on April 23, 2006, in Cheer Up, Earth Day Is Over). In late 2006 Tierney relinquished his column to focus on science reporting. He featured CTC in his Jan. 24, 2007 blog.
There was a time … when the Republican Party was a hotbed of environmental worrywarts. The last big clean air act of the Bush I administration passed the House 401 to 21. But no more, no more. You’re not going to get any sympathy for controlling climate change from a group that doesn’t believe the climate is actually changing … It’s sort of ironic. These are the same folks who constantly seed their antideficit speeches with references to our poor, betrayed descendants. (“This is a burden our children and grandchildren will have to bear.”) Don’t you think the children and grandchildren would appreciate being allowed to hang onto the Arctic ice cap?
Times Economic Columnist Daniel Akst (“On The Contrary”):
Let’s face it: nothing but drastically higher prices will deter most of us from consuming more carbon-based energy… Of course, it would be nice not to have to rely on cartels and circumstances to make us moderate our consumption. Hefty taxes on carbon-based energy … would be a much better approach. The Good News About Oil Prices Is The Bad News, Sept. 17, 2006.
Wall Street Journal business columnist Holman W. Jenkins Jr.:
… walking upright, with knuckles no longer in proximity to the ground, are advocates — mostly economists — of a carbon tax. A carbon tax would be the efficient way of encouraging businesses and consumers to make less carbon-intensive energy choices. Government would not have to exercise an improbable clairvoyance about which technologies will pay off in the future. There’d be less scope for Congress to favor some industries over others purely on the basis of lobbying clout. (Decoding Climate Politics, Jan. 24, 2007) Note: While Jenkins’ remarks should be taken with a heap of salt (he’s no climate advocate, to put it mildly), his praise for a carbon tax and vitriol toward the new enviro-corporate climate alliance are both striking.
Wall Street Journal Op-Ed Contributor Nicole Gelinas, (Contributing Editor to City Journal):
At the end of the day, a strict cap-and-trade program would have the same effect as a carbon tax, one that’s high enough, eventually, to encourage switching to cleaner generation, but that’s gradually imposed over a decade so that companies have plenty of time to plan. Such a tax would make emissions more expensive; discourage carbon-intensive power generation; and it would allow the market to decide which environmentally more-friendly technologies would be competitive enough to take its place. A tax per ton of carbon would mean higher power prices, too, but without direct subsidies to developing nations by paying for their power-plant upgrades. Nor would a carbon tax create a new multibillion-dollar global commodity whose value would depend on political manipulation. The feds could use the revenues from such a levy to reduce other taxes—including dividend and capital-gains taxes further to spur the massive private investment needed to build the next generation of power generators—while ensuring that they’re also creating a political and regulatory climate to encourage such mass-scale construction. If it’s true that a global warming consensus really exists — and not just in press releases and speeches — politicians and business leaders wouldn’t be afraid to suggest such a tax. They would insist on it. A Carbon Tax Would Be Cleaner, Aug. 23, 2007
Washington Post columnists
E.J. Dionne (in 2011):
Obama should put forward a plan of his own to close the long-term deficit. He should not be hemmed in by his negotiations with congressional Republicans to get the debt ceiling raised. They don’t hold the nation’s credit hostage anymore. He should lay out exactly what he would do and abandon his practice of making preemptive concessions to his opponents. That means Obama should not be shy about urging eventual tax increases, particularly on the wealthy. And let’s be clear: These would not be immediate tax hikes; they’d kick in a year or two from now. Any plausible plan should include at least $2 trillion to $2.5 trillion in new revenue over a decade [largely from additional taxes on the wealthy and super-wealthy]. A carbon tax, partly offset by tax cuts or rebates for middle-income and poorer taxpayers, could provide additional revenue. (Obama: Go Big, Long and Global, Aug. 21, 2011)
Anne Applebaum (in 2007):
I no longer believe that a complicated carbon trading regime — in which industries trade emissions “credits” — would work within the United States … So much is at stake for so many industries that the legislative process to create it would be easily distorted by their various lobbies. Any lasting solutions will have to be extremely simple, and — because of the cost implicit in reducing the use and emissions of fossil fuels — will also have to benefit those countries that impose them in other ways. Fortunately, there is such a solution, one that is grippingly unoriginal, requires no special knowledge of economics and is easy for any country to implement. It’s called a carbon tax, and it should be applied across the board … (Global Warming’s Simple Remedy, Feb. 6, 2007)
Anne Applebaum again (in 2009):
American politicians who really care about climate change — I’m assuming this includes our president, as well as a majority in Congress — should skip the summits and instead ask themselves why the oil and gas prices that started rising a couple of years ago (creating a boom in alternative-energy research) have once again dropped to an artificial low. Why artificial? Because the price of fossil fuels has never reflected their true cost, either environmental or political. It doesn’t reflect the cost of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. It doesn’t reflect the cost of treating asthma. And it certainly doesn’t reflect the cost of rescuing bits of the coast of Florida that will be submerged by rising sea levels. Raise the taxes on fossil fuels to reflect those costs, and [T. Boone] Pickens’s [wind farm] project, along with many others, will once again be viable.” (The Summit of Green Futility, July 14, 2009)
Sebastian Mallaby:
These days almost nobody asserts that global warming isn’t happening. Instead, we are confronted with a new lie: that we can respond to climate change without taxing and regulating carbon… We already have technologies to cut carbon… The problem is we don’t use them… What matters is not just the technologies we have but the incentives to deploy them. (A Dated Carbon Approach, July 10, 2006)
Automotive columnist Warren Brown:
Why is it now more politically feasible to send our sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, husband and wives to foreign soil to fight and die for oil than it is for us to place higher taxes on the stuff at home to help reduce our wanton use of it? It’s time to tell Congress that we’re not stupid, not hopelessly blind or irrevocably self-centered. It’s time to demand that Congress give us a real energy policy, one that addresses industry and consumers, one that demands we do what we’ve historically done in times of crises — work together, sacrifice together to solve the problem. Bring Consumers into the Energy Equation, July 1, 2007.
Charles Krauthammer:
Unfortunately, instead of hiking the price [of gasoline] ourselves by means of a gasoline tax that could be instantly refunded to the American people in the form of lower payroll taxes, we let the Saudis, Venezuelans, Russians and Iranians do the taxing for us — and pocket the money that the tax would have recycled back to the American worker. This is insanity. For 25 years and with utter futility (starting with “The Oil-Bust Panic,” the New Republic, February 1983), I have been advocating the cure: a U.S. energy tax as a way to curtail consumption and keep the money at home. On this page in May 2004 (and again in November 2005, I called for “the government — through a tax — to establish a new floor for gasoline,” by fully taxing any drop in price below a certain benchmark. The point was to suppress demand and to keep the savings (from any subsequent world price drop) at home in the U.S. Treasury rather than going abroad. At the time, oil was $41 a barrel. It is now $123. But instead of doing the obvious — tax the damn thing — we go through spasms of destructive alternatives, such as efficiency standards, ethanol mandates and now a crazy carbon cap-and-trade system the Senate is debating this week. These are infinitely complex mandates for inefficiency and invitations to corruption. But they have a singular virtue: They hide the cost to the American consumer. At $4, Everybody Gets Rational, June 6, 2008.
Other Publications
Financial Times Columnist Clive Crook:
If ever there were a case for the maxim, get prices right, this is it. The way to curb carbon emissions is to add the environmental cost of carbon to the price of energy. The current oil price offers a good opportunity: when it falls (as it probably will) a carbon tax could be used to set a floor, making the transition to correctly priced energy much easier. Once the price of energy is right, other decisions become simpler, or can be left mainly to the market. There is no need to legislate fuel economy standards or subsidise conservation and low-carbon forms of energy; no need for an emissions trading regime, with all the waste and complexity and gaming that that entails (witness Europe’s experience); no need to scapegoat oil companies or environmentalists; no need to mislead or pander. For sure, the politics is a challenge – but not, I am willing to bet, as hard as conventional wisdom insists. Carbon is bad: tax it and use the money to cut other taxes. A new kind of politician could do something with that. Financial Times Online June 22, 2008.
Clive Crook (again in FT):
In the US, cap-and-trade was dead even before the midterm elections. The Obama administration plans to rely on regulation instead. [B]ut … this micro-regulatory approach will be costly. The bureaucratic overhead will be huge, as producers vie for waivers and other special treatment. Effort and resources will be misdirected… Where, then, should the government concentrate its efforts? No prizes for guessing the answer: introduce a carbon tax. … In the US, many dismiss this as a political impossibility. They are wrong. Whether the country likes it or not, with or without an effective climate change policy, Americans will eventually have to pay more in taxes. The state of the public finances decrees it. However you do the political calculations, this unpopular outcome is inevitable. Therefore, start measuring a carbon tax against the relevant alternatives. At worst, a moderate carbon tax would be no more indigestible than higher income taxes or other revenue-raising options. And, in every important way, it would be the best climate-change policy as well… Compared to EPA action, a carbon tax is simpler, more transparent, less susceptible to rent-seeking and more economical in bureaucratic overhead. It also provides an indicator around which future international co-operation could be organised and explained. After their break in Cancún, if the US and other governments want to get serious, this is where they should look.” Stop Talking and Start Taxing Carbon, Nov. 28, 2010. (emphasis added)
Clive Crook (now, late 2011, in Businessweek):
Quantity targets enforced by treaty don’t foster effective cooperation, they hinder it… to succeed, measures to curb emissions need to be sustained for decades… Binding emissions targets are too rigid… The best instrument for coordinating climate-change efforts is the price of carbon… For most countries, the simplest and clearest way to hit the price target would be with an outright carbon tax. The economic benefits are well known: By letting markets work, a tax achieves a given amount of emissions abatement at the lowest cost. The world needs to cap its greenhouse gas emissions, but there’s no obligation to do this in the most expensive, painful or disruptive way. Climate-change campaigners made a great mistake early on in opposing this approach — arguing, in effect, that sin should be prohibited not taxed, and that cuts of a certain size had to be assured. The cost of this inflexibility is now apparent: Insist on known and guaranteed cuts in emissions, and the wheels of international cooperation turn too slowly. So far, explicit carbon taxes have not been widely adopted (though where they have been, as in British Columbia, they have worked). It’s not only environmentalists who aren’t enthusiastic. In many countries, especially the U.S., conservatives are bitterly opposed as well. A carbon tax, after all, is a tax. Yet with many countries in a fiscal crisis, a carbon tax is more attractive than before. A carbon tax could lift some of the burden from spending cuts and increases in other taxes. As this sinks in, what was once politically impossible may soon be merely hard. Free Markets, Carbon Tax Best Way to Fight Climate Change: View, Bloomberg Businessweek, Dec. 12, 2011.
San Francisco Chronicle columnist Carolyn Lochhead:
One day, someone’s going to put two and two together and discover that East Bay Rep. Pete Stark’s carbon tax could address global warming and budget troubles at the same time. San Francisco pols are ahead of the curve, proposing a gas tax — a close cousin of the carbon tax — to fight global warming… In policy circles, a carbon tax is a no brainer, embraced by lefties like Stark and conservatives like former Bush economic advisor Gregory Mankiw. It’s a highly efficient way to reduce demand for fossil fuels and induce alternative energy supplies by using market forces. That’s also why it gags politicians: it incorporates the true cost of fossil fuel consumption in prices. Polluting consumers would pay too. Two Vultures, One Stone, Oct. 15, 2007.
Newark Star-Ledger Columnist Paul Mushine:
We need a new generation of clean energy that will enable us to be liberated from dangerous dependence on dictatorships, effective in worldwide competition and provide for a much cleaner and healthier future,” says [Gingrich’s] Web site. These “alternative, renewable energies” that Gingrich is promoting sound the same as the mystery oil Pelosi’s pushing. Like ethanol, these fuels can be manufactured only with huge government subsidies. And those subsidies represent an indirect tax on drivers If we’re going to tax drivers, we might as well do it directly. This is a point upon which most free-market economists agree. Unlike politicians, economists are not up for election, so they can tell the truth about cutting oil imports. And the truth is if you want to cut imports, tax the hell out of gas. The imposition of so-called “Pigovian taxes,” named after the late economist Ar thur Pigou, generates lots of revenue that can be used to reduce other taxes, such as the income tax, that are much worse for economic growth. And such taxes also reduce what Pigou termed “externalities,” the externalities in this case being air pollution, traffic jams and reliance on unstable exporters. On Energy, Dems are Daffy, Newt is Nuts, op-ed, Star-Ledger, August 7, 2007.
Chicago Tribune Editorial Board Member Steve Chapman:
The free market is the best system ever created for providing what we want at the lowest possible cost. The way to get affordable amelioration of climate change is to put the market to work finding solutions. To achieve that, we merely need to make energy prices reflect the potential harm done by greenhouse gases. How? With a carbon tax that assesses fuels according to how much they pollute. Coal, having the highest carbon content, would be taxed the most, followed by oil and natural gas. The higher prices for the most damaging fuels would encourage people and companies to use them less and more of other types of energy, including nuclear, solar, wind and biofuels. This approach also would affect all sources — not just cars, which account for only one-fifth of all U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. Saving the Earth Sensibly, Chicago Tribune, April 12, 2007.
Economists almost unanimously agree that if you want to cut greenhouse gas emissions by curbing gasoline consumption, the sensible way to do it is not by dictating the design of cars but by influencing the behavior of drivers. If you want less of something, such as pollution from cars, the surest way is to charge people more for it. A carbon tax or a higher gasoline tax would encourage every motorist, not just those with new vehicles, to burn less fuel—by taking the bus, carpooling, telecommuting, resorting to that free mode of transit known as walking, or buying a Prius. A Wrong Turn on Saving Fuel – Which Energy Efficiency Plans Hold Up to Scrutiny?, reason.com, July 23, 2007.
[T]he GOP doesn’t have to surrender its principles to confront environmental reality. There is plenty of room for disagreement, for instance, about how to combat global warming. The method most congenial to personal and economic freedom is a carbon tax. Instead of putting the government behind favored forms of energy, as the administration likes to do, it would create strong incentives for people to find their own ways to reduce emissions. It would achieve maximum benefits at minimum cost. It could be revenue-neutral, if the receipts were used to pay for other tax cuts. A carbon tax is hardly a liberal idea. Among its proponents are Gregory Mankiw, who headed the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush, and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, John McCain’s chief economist during his presidential campaign. But Republican politicians have no interest. During hard economic times, that approach may work. But at some point, voters will conclude that global warming and other environmental problems demand solutions. And Republicans will be left wondering why they didn’t come up with any. Republicans vs. the Environment, June 16, 2011.
Atlanta Journal-Constitution editorial-page editor Cynthia Tucker (writing in the Baltimore Sun):
The president should have told Americans years ago that the days of cheap gas were over. If the president had imposed a stiff tax on gasoline at the pump [after 9/11], American motorists would have grumbled, but we would have gotten over it. (Oiloholic Nation Has No Business Lecturing China, April 24, 2006)
Arizona Republic columnist Robert Robb:
Economists have long preferred a carbon tax to a cap-and-trade regimen. A small tax would likely have a large effect. Once the infrastructure for collecting the tax is in place, an increased rate is just a vote away. Even with a small tax, carbon emissions would become an unpredictable variable cost, creating a large incentive to reconfigure production processes to reduce or eliminate them …Politicians frequently ignore the preferences of economists, since economists usually prefer a reduced role for the preferences of politicians … However, if serious action is to be taken on global warming, someone in the political class needs to start paying attention to them. (Cool It on Global Warming, Feb. 7, 2007)
New York Observer Columnist Nicholas von Hoffman:
When they talk about conservation at all — which is almost never — [politicians] talk in terms of new tax deductions when they ought to be talking about imposing new taxes. How about a heavy energy-consumption tax on McMansions?… Similar kinds of taxes could be imposed on whole classes of machines that pour filth into the atmosphere and consume frightful amounts of fuel. (While Politicians Pander, Conservation Is Ignored, May 15, 2006)
Although CTC seeks to tax all carbon emissions, not just those from uses deemed excessive, we share with von Hoffman the view that taxing carbon is more important than subsidizing carbon alternatives.
Toronto Star columnist David Olive:
Carbon taxes are coming … The carbon tax [is] the single most powerful tool for encouraging conservation of the planet’s finite coal, oil and natural gas resources, and for diminishing the role of CO2 emissions in destroying the earth. Only Carbon Taxes Can Rekindle Conservation, March 9, 2007.
Magazines
The New Republic
In theory, if the United States ever got serious about tackling climate change and put a price on carbon–through either a cap-and-trade system or a simple carbon tax–we could put an end to much of this anguished contrarianism. Shoppers concerned about melting icecaps wouldn’t have to scratch their heads and wonder how many food miles a tomato has traveled, or fret about whether a tightly packed ship full of produce from Chile emits more carbon than having everyone haul groceries in their SUVs from the local farm. The climate impact would be reflected in the price, and markets could work their magic. Simple enough.OK, so it wouldn’t be that simple. Carbon pricing and markets alone won’t, for instance, produce better public transportation. Nor will they put an end to the vast array of government policies that subsidize suburban sprawl–which include, among other things, easy financing for roads, tax deductions for large McMansions, and various zoning regulations that can prevent mixed-use living and disfavor walkable town centers. Nor, for that matter, will they get rid of the federal subsidies that prop up the nation’s agricultural system. (On the other hand, a carbon tax might convince voters that these policies should be altered.) Second-Guessing the Conventional Environmental Wisdom — It’s Not Easy Being Green, Bradford Plumer, assistant editor, The New Republic on-line, Aug. 27, 2007.
Atlantic Monthly
Blogger Megan McArdle (“Asymmetric Information”) used the “local food” quandary to discourse on the capacity of carbon taxes to provide honest information on the true carbon costs of consumer purchases:
How much carbon goes into the food we eat? Recently I’ve been beseiged by buy-local fanatics, claiming that if I eat Guatamalan raspberries, I’m killing the earth with the carbon needed to transport them… [T]his … cause[d] me to try to figure out how much energy the various options consume, and frankly, the answer is, I have no clue. There are so many second, third, and eighth order effects that my brain is spinning… Not only has no one done a good analysis of this subject; I don’t think anyone could… That’s why if we’re serious about cutting carbon dioxide emissions, we need a carbon tax, and not CAFE, or other sorts of piecemeal regulatory solutions. The Perils of Buy Local, Oct. 15.
McArdle’s column, including her invocation of free-enterprise philosopher Friedrich Hayek, is worth reading in full.
The Nation
The Nation published a special issue Surviving the Climate Crisis: What Must Be Done on May 7, 2007. It included a strong editorial, Going Green, stating that in order to reach the “necessarily ambitious goal: 80 percent emission reduction in carbon emissions from their 1990 levels by 2050:
We’ll have to discourage emissions by putting a price on polluting gases like methane and carbon. The best way to do that is through taxation, which would be offset by tax breaks to soften the impact on poor and middle-class households and to encourage green job growth and investment. But such ideas face formidable resistance from a political establishment beholden to entrenched interests–the oil and coal industries–that stand to lose out. Those industries have sunk billions of dollars in investments that would depreciate in value if real carbon reduction targets were achieved. Thus, they fight tooth and nail with lies and canards to keep things as they are.
In the same issue of The Nation, financial journalist Doug Henwood wrote:
Given the risk that a climate catastrophe could hit soon and suddenly … we may not have time for mass movements to develop and force elites to do the right thing. They’ve got to get started now, or all could be doomed. But … there are problems with their favorite strategy: cap-and-trade schemes… Already an entire industry has grown up around the trading system — analysts and brokers and traders who hope to make money from the scheme but contribute not much of anything to saving the planet. Also, cap-and-trade permit prices are tremendously volatile, more so even than the stock market. Volatility makes long-term planning very difficult. A far better approach would be to tax carbon. A carbon tax would be simple — gasoline, coal and other fuels would be taxed based on their carbon content — and nearly impossible to evade. It could be introduced quickly, unlike the multiyear phase-in of the complicated EU cap-and-trade system. The tax rate could start low and then increase, to allow energy users to adjust. Unlike the market volatility of CO2 and SO2 permit prices, a carbon tax would be predictable, making it much easier for businesses and consumers to plan ahead. And as Charles Komanoff of the Carbon Tax Center argues, at least part of the proceeds of the tax could be rebated to poor and middle-income households through the income tax system, neutralizing any inequities.” Cooler Elites, May 7, 2007 issue.
Hendrik Hertzberg, The New Yorker magazine
The veteran commentator Hendrik Hertzberg wrote in the Feb. 13 & 20, 2006 issue:
The best way to encourage conservation — and the true sign of a serious energy policy — would be imposing a hefty gasoline tax and raising mandatory fuel-efficiency standards.
Hertzberg broadened this theme in the March 23, 2009 issue:
If the economic crisis necessitates a second stimulus—and it probably will—then a payroll-tax holiday deserves a look. But it’s only half a good idea. A whole good idea would be to make a payroll-tax holiday the first step in an orderly transition to scrapping the payroll tax altogether and replacing the lost revenue with a package of levies on things that, unlike jobs, we want less rather than more of—things like pollution, carbon emissions, oil imports, inefficient use of energy and natural resources, and excessive consumption. The net tax burden on the economy would be unchanged, but the shift in relative price signals would nudge investment from resource-intensive enterprises toward labor-intensive ones. This wouldn’t be just a tax adjustment. It would be an environmental program, an anti-global-warming program, a youth-employment (and anti-crime) program, and an energy program. (emphasis added)
Others
Newsweek columnist Fareed Zakaria:
Both problems [clean energy’s insufficient funding and insufficient incentives] can be solved by the same simple idea—a tax on spewing carbon into the atmosphere. Once you tax carbon, you make it cheaper to produce clean energy. If burning coal and petrol in current ways becomes more expensive because of the damage they do to the environment, people will find ways to get energy out of alternative fuels or methods. Along the way, industrial societies will earn tax revenues that they can use, in part, to subsidize clean energy for the developing world. It is the only way to solve the problem at a global level, which is the only level at which the solution is meaningful. Congress is currently considering a variety of proposals that address this issue. Most are a smorgasbord of caps, credits and regulations. Instead of imposing a simple carbon tax that would send a clear signal to the markets, Congress wants to create a set of hidden taxes through a “cap and trade” system. The Europeans have adopted a similar system, which is unwieldy and prone to gaming and cheating. The Case for a Global Carbon Tax, April 16, 2007.
Newsweek columnist Robert J. Samuelson:
If we’re going to use price to try to stimulate those new technologies, let’s at least do it honestly. Most economists think that a straightforward tax on carbon would have the same incentive effects for alternative fuels and conservation as cap-and-trade without the rigidities and uncertainties of emission limits. A tax is more visible, understandable and democratic. If environmental groups still prefer an allowance system, let’s call it by its proper name: ‘cap and tax.’ Let’s Just Call It ‘Cap and Tax’, June 9, 2008.
Reason Magazine Science Editor Ronald Bailey:
The problem with air pollution—and global warming is a form of air pollution—is that I don’t see a good, easy way to privatize it. The transaction costs are too large. And if you can’t privatize it, you have to regulate it. So now the question is: What’s the least bad way to regulate? And that is why I’ve come out in favor of a carbon tax….For consumers, for inventors, for innovators, a tax offers price stability in a way that the cap-and-trade markets don’t. For example, in the sulfur dioxide market, sulfur permits have ranged in price from $50 a ton to over $1,000 a ton. And for sulfur dioxide, it’s a smaller market. A carbon market would encompass the world.” Reason.com July 2008
Katherine Ellison (The Mommy Brain):
What our kids need to know most is that adults are acting like grown-ups… If we want to show our kids we mean business about global warming, let’s start by ponying up for a carbon tax. Let our children watch us demand this from Washington with the courage and force of the civil rights movement. (Global Warming-era Parenthood, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 23, 2006)
350.org founder and author-journalist Bill McKibben:
There’s another way of saying what is missing here. Almost every idea that might bring us a better future would be made much easier if the cost of fossil fuel was higher—if there was some kind of a tax on carbon emissions that made the price of coal and oil and gas reflect its true environmental cost.” (How Close to Catastrophe?, New York Review of Books, Nov. 16, 2006.) McKibben, author of the classic The End of Nature and a supremely effective and engaged climate activist, has also advocated for carbon taxes in articles in Orion, Grist, Mother Jones and elsewhere.
Vox.com (earlier, Grist) columnist David Roberts:
A carbon tax is a huge deal, a game-changer, and if it’s taking root, even tenuously, it needs to be nurtured. Is This the Right Time to Attack Dingell?, June 2007.
Note, though, that Roberts (who now writes for vox.com) for years has criticized the effort to enact a U.S. carbon tax as politically naive. Our 2012 exchange with him is particularly illuminating.
Former George W. Bush speechwriter David Frum: Writing in The Wall Street Journal on Nov. 9, 2006, Frum urged Bush to send Congress a carbon-tax bill. In his 2008 book, Comeback: Conservatism That Can Win Again, Frum pressed carbon-tax advocacy at greater length:
There is a simpler and better way to encourage consumers to conserve while denying income to producers: Tax those forms of energy that present political and environmental risks — and exempt those that do not. That tax will create an inbuilt price advantage for all the untaxed energy sources, which could then battle for market share on their competitive merits. What would such a tax look like? … It would look exactly like the carbon tax advocated by global-warming crusaders…You don’t have to believe that global warming is a problem to recognize that a carbon tax is the solution. Under the umbrella of a permanent disadvantage for fossil fuels, markets could figure out freely which substitutes made most sense. (p. 129)
The Unique Power of Carbon Taxes? These Climate Hawks Are Missing It
Pricing carbon pollution brings out the knives. In 2009, right-wing denialists scuttled the ambitious Waxman-Markey bill by carving up its cap-and-trade centerpiece. In 2016, lefty ideologues like Food and Water Watch butchered what would have been a groundbreaking Washington state carbon tax.
Now comes a new twist: attacks from brainy pro-climate types like activist-scholar Leah Stokes, poli sci professor at the University of California’s Santa Barbara campus and a popular climate commentator on progressive media.
Stokes let loose last month with a broadside: The Trouble With Carbon Pricing, an extended essay in Boston Review co-written with her departmental colleague Matto Mildenberger. “Carbon pricing has dominated conversations around climate policy for decades, but it is ineffective,” intoned the subhead. “Only a bold approach that centers politics can meet the problem at its scale.”
Calling carbon taxing ineffectual is odd, when it’s barely been tried, and never at the triple-digit level ($100 or more per ton of carbon dioxide) that could slash emissions by a third or more. As we show below, the Mildenberger-Stokes article holds carbon pricing to a standard — closing down the U.S. and world fossil fuel sectors in a few decades — that no stand-alone policy could possibly meet. Their article also stereotypes carbon tax proponents as blinded by carbon pricing’s elegance, when what dazzles many of us is its potential to yield deep emission cuts while also neutering the fossil fuel companies.
Nevertheless, Mildenberger and Stokes have thrown down the serious gauntlet of whether carbon pricing should be the centerpiece of climate organizing and legislating. Their article is also useful for assembling so many criticisms of carbon pricing in one place.
To hold their article up to the light, we’ve posted key excerpts, with our responses alongside. (NB: except for the section heads, everything in the left column is quoted verbatim.)
The trouble with carbon pricingBy Matto Mildenberger & Leah C. Stokes, Boston Review 1. Carbon pricing isn’t working in California. Over a decade ago, California put a price on carbon pollution. At first glance the policy appears to be a success: since it began in 2013, emissions have declined by more than 8 percent. Today the program manages 85 percent of the state’s carbon pollution: the widest coverage of any policy in the world… But while the policy looks good on paper, in practice it has proven weak. Since 2013 the annual supply of pollution permits has been consistently higher than overall pollution. As a result, the price to pollute is low, and likely to remain that way for another decade… This is not a surprise. Though legislators aimed to tighten the law in 2017, oil and gas lobbyists thwarted their efforts. One powerful labor union initially supported ending free permits for big polluters, but reversed its position after Chevron offered it a union contract to retrofit refineries. The final legislation prohibited enacting new regulations on California’s fossil fuel industry — regulations that could have done more than the state’s weak carbon price. ![]() CTC director Charles Komanoff was lead author of this report lauded by M+S. Rather than carbon pricing, other regulations — clean electricity standards, clean car programs, and aggressive energy efficiency — deserve much of the credit for the state’s progress. |
Why carbon taxes still matterBy Charles Komanoff, Carbon Tax Center 1. California carbon pricing is off to a fine start. While CTC would have preferred California price its carbon pollution directly with a carbon tax, we’re glad to see Mildenberger & Stokes report that the state’s carbon emissions have fallen more than 8 percent since cap-and-trade started up. That decline exceeds by at least half the 5.4 percent drop for the U.S. as a whole in 2013-2019 (calculated from national emissions data in the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020), even as California’s economy was booming relative to the rest of the country. It’s regrettable that industry hardball watered down the program. But the authors present no evidence that emission reductions from unspecified “new regulations on California’s fossil fuels industry” would have surpassed those from carbon pricing. (The ProPublica story they linked to is silent on that score.) We’ve studied and applauded the state’s clean electricity standards and aggressive energy efficiency for more than four decades. M+S even cited our 2019 report documenting and quantifying these policies’ accomplishments, California Stars: Lighting the Way to a Clean Energy Future, shown at left. (They linked to it at “regulations,” in the last paragraph.) But much of energy demand and the resultant use of fossil fuels falls into huge pockets that even the best-crafted standards can’t touch, as we’ve discussed many times, at length (e.g., here and here). Unlike M+S, we don’t shy from touting the synergies between carbon pricing and energy standards. And there’s this benefit, too: Carbon pricing has already narrowed California’s “environmental justice gap,” as we documented in a new post earlier this week. |
2. Carbon pricing enrages right-wing populists.
California is one of only twelve U.S. states to have adopted any carbon price — the idea has simply proven difficult to enact. When Oregon attempted to vote on a carbon pricing bill in 2019, Republican legislators fled the state and hid in Idaho to prevent the quorum necessary to pass the law. And this isn’t just happening in the United States — the policy is politically unpopular around the world. When Australia passed a modest carbon tax in 2011, things got ugly quickly: right-wing radio hosts hurled misogynistic invectives against Prime Minister Julia Gillard; angry protesters descended on the parliament building in Canberra; and climate-denying opposition leader Tony Abbott crisscrossed the country, accusing the government of “economic vandalism.” When he took office three years later, Abbott quickly repealed the policy. In France a proposed carbon tax fueled the country’s yellow vest movement, triggering the worst domestic riots since 1968. The proposal was soon abandoned. |
2. Win over populists with wealth taxes.
As M+S surely know, the U.S. right is in open revolt against all climate action (even light-bulb efficiency standards!), not just carbon pricing. Ditto Australia. France’s “yellow vesters” weren’t protesting climate action, they were rising up against the yawning gap separating them from the super-rich, a gap that President Macron cruelly widened when he dialed back wealth taxes just before he pushed through a modest carbon levy that exempted aviation fuel. (See Christopher Ketcham’s vivid, on-the-ground reporting for Harper’s on the gilet jaunes, which we summarized last year.) The climate movement can harness the growing fury at the ever-expanding wealth gap with a program to tax both extreme wealth *and* carbon emissions and invest the proceeds into the Green New Deal, as we’ve written here. |
3. “Carbon pricing lets markets do the job.”
Part of [carbon pricing’s] enduring appeal is that it provides an elegant response to a complex problem. Carbon pollution is everywhere. So, economists argue, increase the cost of releasing it into the atmosphere, and let markets take care of the rest. [emphasis added] |
3. Repeat: carbon pricing is not a market measure.
Taxing carbon emissions has nothing to do with “markets” and everything to do with fixing the enormous market failure that allows fossil fuel companies and monster-truck drivers and frequent flyers pay zero for climate pollution. Please, can we all retire the “lets markets do the job” nonsense? |
4. Good on paper, poor in practice.
As climate change research grew more prominent in the 1980s, economists described pollution as a “negative externality” — polluters kept the profits from selling fossil fuels while society at large picked up the tab for the harm they caused. (emphasis added) If problems such as acid rain were “market failures,” then pricing forced polluters to “internalize” the costs. Anyone who released carbon pollution into the atmosphere would have to pay for the harm they caused. Policymakers have consistently pushed this idea at every level since the 1990s. And many economists remain attached to it: over 3,500 U.S. economists, including twenty-seven Nobel laureates, have signed a letter supporting carbon pricing… The idea developed into two main forms: a carbon tax and cap and trade. Carbon taxes impose a price on every unit of carbon pollution released. Cap and trade — also called emissions trading — limits the quantity of carbon pollution that can be released, with polluters trading permits to cover their emissions. Both methods promise the same theoretical result: a reduction in pollution. Like the roots of a tree branching out in search of water, a carbon price would find carbon wherever it was released. Goods made with fossil fuels would rise in cost. In response, people would make a million tiny decisions to get off carbon: buying the electric-powered lawn mower rather than the gas guzzler, jumping on a bicycle for the last mile rather than calling an Uber, switching to an induction stovetop and ditching the fossil gas. And it wouldn’t just be the public changing its ways; industries would also find places to cut back on carbon as their cost of doing business rose. Policymakers dreamed of sending these signals out across the economy to coordinate distant actors wherever the messages found them. The government could not possibly regulate all the myriad ways that carbon was emitted, but the power of the market could solve the problem — at least in theory. The problem with carbon pricing is not the idea on paper—it is its application in practice. According to economists, an effective carbon price must be high enough to make polluters pay for the externalities they generate. It must also cover all economy-wide sources of carbon pollution. |
4. Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
First, a shoutout to Mildenberger & Stokes for elegantly articulating the rationale for carbon pricing in their third paragraph at left (“Like the roots of a tree branching out in search of water …”). Bravo! Nevertheless, their formulation betrays a significant fallacy: The vast externalities from burning fossil fuels aren’t pocketed by the companies that extract and sell them, despite what M+S imply (“polluters kept the profits from selling fossil fuels”). Rather, so long as there’s a modicum of competition — as there is in the oil business — the monetary difference between the market price and the true social cost accrues to consumers. Absent carbon pricing, everyone who flips a switch, operates a vehicle or buys a manufactured product pays less than full price for the fossil fuels that enable the activity. Worldwide, the richest 1% of consumers cause double the carbon emissions of the poorest 50%, notes Oxfam in new research reported by The Guardian. In other words, the lion’s share of the multi-trillion dollar fossil fuels externality is pocketed by the global rich. The class disparity in U.S. emissions, though rising, is less stark, but here too, an outsize share of the carbon subsidy accrues to those who drive the oversized vehicles, jet around the globe, heat and cool their multiple dwellings, and so forth. If any fact deserves to be “centered” in progressive discourse about climate change and carbon pricing, it’s this one. Lately, though, the idea of human participation in fossil fuel use has been discarded. Current dogma pins all climate responsibility on the fossil fuel industry, even though the industry’s lifeblood is the gas pump and the light switch. The fossil fuel purveyors have plenty to account for. But centering them in policy seems to have lulled Mildenberger & Stokes into a binary view of carbon pricing, e.g., “an effective carbon price must be high enough to make polluters pay for the externalities they generate.” Actually, no. Any carbon price will set off a cascade of actions (as captured in that marvelous M+S third paragraph) causing cuts in carbon emissions. The higher the price, the greater the cascade. There is no single carbon price threshold or tipping point. The task before us is to win the highest carbon prices possible. |
5. Anyway, carbon prices are too low.
Carbon prices now exist in 46 countries, covering about 22 percent of the carbon pollution that humans release each year. But these policies are riddled with loopholes… Big carbon polluters — fossil fuel companies, electric utilities, automakers, petrochemical companies, and other heavy industries — have used their structural power to receive policy exemptions, handcuffing the invisible hand of carbon pricing. The result is that carbon pricing passes in the places that already have little pollution. For example, all U.S. states with [some] carbon pricing already had below average per capita energy-related carbon pollution in 2006, before these policies came into effect… Even when prices do exist, they are quite low. According to the World Bank, countries need policies between $40 to $80 per tonne to meet the Paris Agreement targets. Yet half of the world’s carbon prices are less than $10 per tonne, while only five countries — Sweden, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and France — are in the target range. Even the prices in these countries are probably too low. Estimates for the social cost of carbon — a measure of the societal harm carbon pollution causes—range from a couple dozen to several hundred dollars per tonne of CO2. University of California San Diego climate scientist Kate Ricke and colleagues estimate this social cost could be a staggering $417 per tonne. No carbon price in the world comes close to that number. |
5. The stall in carbon prices isn’t immutable.
It’s true that carbon pricing has stalled throughout the world. Too few countries have it, too few sectors are covered, and prices are far too low. This wasn’t pre-ordained. A promising moment for carbon pricing in 2008, sparked by British Columbia’s successful carbon tax launch, was snuffed out when the Great Recession unleashed a storm of right-wing nationalism. A second window — the 2014 U.S.-China bilateral agreement and the ensuing 2015 Paris climate accord — slammed shut a year later when Trump took power in Washington. We don’t wave away these facts, and we acknowledge how easily carbon pricing becomes kindling for climate resistance. This knowledge informed our decision to refrain from protesting the downplaying of carbon pricing in the Democratic Party’s 2020 platform. Likewise our decision in late 2019 to expand CTC’s mission to include taxing extreme wealth along with carbon emissions (see Point 2). Nevertheless, the fact that CO2 taxes of four hundred dollars a ton aren’t on the horizon doesn’t invalidate the ability of robust carbon taxes to propel large-scale reductions in emissions (see Point 6). We don’t have to “center” carbon taxing in climate policy, it just needs to be in the mix. And by making the carbon tax income-progressive, we can ensure that the mix is progressive as well. |
6. Carbon pricing won’t deliver the goods anyway.
In Norway, which has one of the highest carbon prices in the world, emissions in the oil sector rose by 78 percent between 1990 and 2017. One reason emissions didn’t fall is because of a problem economists call “demand inelasticity”: if an economic activity is extremely profitable, or if there are no easy alternatives, people and companies may not demand less even as prices increase… The evidence is mixed, however, on whether carbon prices can drive innovation and provide more of these cheaper substitutes we need. In her study of the national U.S. cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide, Margaret Taylor found that innovation actually declined after the system went into effect. As Tobias Schmidt has shown, cap-and-trade systems tend to produce incremental improvements in polluting technologies rather than driving new, clean alternatives. Other research suggests limited innovation. In their study of the EU’s carbon market, economists Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre estimate that patenting increased by 9 percent for regulated firms. However, given how few companies fell under the carbon price, overall low carbon technology patenting increased by less than 1 percent. Carbon price-induced patenting in the UK may have been considerably higher. Still, we lack strong evidence that carbon pricing has rapidly induced the innovation we need in new, cleaner technologies. By focusing on the low-hanging fruit—the “cheapest” ways to cut carbon pollution —we fail to build the ladder necessary to curb the more difficult emissions to reduce. And that shouldn’t surprise us. Consider this scenario: if the United States managed to implement a $50 per tonne carbon price, gasoline prices would increase by $0.44 per gallon. That means Americans’ monthly driving costs would increase by about $25, enough to put a dent in many families’ budgets. Some people might drive a bit less; a few might set up a carpool. But corporations will not innovate new technology because of minor tweaks in the price of energy. The prices of oil already fluctuate greatly year to year, and that hasn’t exactly produced the climate technology we need. |
6. Really? Look again.
Norway’s oil and gas extraction sector makes for a strange anti-pricing example, insofar as the sector’s carbon emissions have risen no faster than its growth in output (see calculations at end of section). Moreover, because Norway’s carbon tax hasn’t changed since the early 1990’s, it wouldn’t be expected to be driving cuts in emissions today. What the tax may have done is contribute to Norway’s oil and gas sector’s superior emissions intensity, nearly 60 percent less than the world average, according to research by Denis Hoffman, a chemical engineer working in Canada’s petrochemical industry, resulting partly from removing CO2 from natural gas and injecting it into undersea caverns — precisely the kind of innovation that M+S insist isn’t driven by carbon prices. The deeper truth is that while alternatives to buying and burning fuels may be easy or hard, depending on circumstance, they are almost always more available than most folks imagine or than M+S imply. Our own statistical analysis of U.S. gasoline usage since 1960 points to a price-elasticity of around (minus) 0.35, which translates to at least a 20 percent reduction in use from doubling the price. How would the reduction happen? Through daily behavior changes (trip-chaining, choosing closer destinations, more walk-bike-bus-train, less lead-footed driving) and, over time, changes in capital stocks (fewer guzzlers, more investment in and purchase of EV’s, greater infill development, and so forth). If we don’t see much give in gas use due to price swings, it’s because of the swings themselves. A carbon tax with a highly transparent annual ramp-up in the tax level would have less noise and more signal, spurring greater reductions. Our Norway calculations, unpacked: Per BP, Norway extracted 0.91 exajoules of fossil gas in 1990 along with 1,716,000 bbl/day of crude oil in 1990, and 4.12 EJ of gas in 2019 and 1,731,000 bbl/day of oil in 2019. Using 1 Btu = 1055 J and ascribing 5.8 million Btu to each barrel of crude oil, we have 1990 extraction of 0.863 quadrillion Btu’s (“Q”) of gas and 3.633 Q of oil totaling 4.496 Q, and, for 2019, 3.905 Q of gas and 3.665 Q of oil totaling 7.570 Q. The 1990-2019 increase in quads is 68.4 percent. We thank Prof. Mildenberger for updating his emissions figure to a 70 percent rise to 2019 and for clarifying that the figure covers oil and gas extraction. |
7. The emission reductions are too small.
If it hasn’t driven the necessary innovation, perhaps carbon pricing has delivered emission cuts? One model suggests Norway’s carbon tax reduced carbon pollution by about 2 percent in its first decade. Similarly the EU cap-and-trade system likely reduced emissions by about 4 percent between 2008 and 2016. In British Columbia, Canada, the carbon tax may have been more successful, reducing emissions by 5–15 percent between 2008 and 2015. But these reductions, while laudable, are nothing compared to what needs to be done — we need annual cuts of almost 8 percent a year until 2030 to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Evidence suggests carbon pricing won’t drive emissions reductions quickly enough. It is like bringing a stick to a knife fight. The policy might help for a little while, but it’s unlikely to secure a victory without other weapons to attack the problem. Economists have tried to sharpen the stick, pushing for better policy design, higher prices, and broader coverage. But their efforts have largely failed. |
7. Solid evidence, wrong conclusion.
The percentage figures from M+S at left seem right to us, especially for British Columbia, which we examined in depth in 2015, finding that per-capita emissions there fell 3-4 times faster than in non-taxing Canadian provinces during the first five years of BC’s carbon tax. That tax started in 2008 at $10 per ton of CO2 and topped out in 2012 at $30 — close to the limit of what a lone province or state can bear without huge gaming or leakage. If a $30 tax can cut emissions by 5-15 percent, imagine what triple-digit carbon taxes could accomplish. Rather than demonstrating that carbon pricing can’t drive emissions reductions quickly, BC’s success points to robustly rising carbon taxes’ vast potential. Mildenberger & Stokes are absolutely right that carbon pricing needs complementary policies. Few proponents of carbon pricing disagree. Economists haven’t failed, it’s the political system that hasn’t delivered. Criticism by climate hawks like M+S isn’t helping. |
8. Carbon dividends: just another try.
Carbon pricing … makes it easy for fossil fuel companies to rally opposition. Presenting themselves as champions of the little guy, these companies highlight how the policy would increase gasoline and electricity costs for the public. Polluters have even helped school boards and local governments estimate impacts from a carbon tax on their budgets. It’s not difficult to draw attention to these costs when everywhere we drive, giant signs declare the price of gasoline. If that number rises, people notice. There are no roadside signs displaying the devastating costs of climate change: wildfires, stronger hurricanes, rising sea levels, and new infectious diseases like COVID-19. What if we could make the benefits of carbon pricing more visible? This is the logic behind the price-and-dividend approach. Canada and Switzerland are the only two countries that have adopted this policy, though it is also part of proposed legislation in Congress. Like traditional cap and trade, this policy would cap emissions and require that companies buy pollution permits. Then U.S. residents with Social Security numbers would receive money back from the program, gathered from polluting firms. According to political scientist Theda Skocpol, a dividend would give the public a tangible benefit to organize around, thus contesting the power that entrenched polluters have over U.S. policymaking. Give the public a green check every month, the thinking goes, and it might just embrace climate policies. This is especially true for low-income households. Recent models by economists Anders Fremstad and Mark Paul show that a U.S. carbon tax, without compensation, would impose the greatest burdens on low-income households. A dividend could be designed to disproportionately return revenues to poor households. Carbon price and dividend gives greater attention to the politics of climate policy than earlier approaches, but it still struggles to make the benefits more salient than the costs. In the two countries with a price and dividend, the benefits are buried in income tax or health insurance forms. In our own research, we find these policies do not substantively increase public support for climate policy. This shouldn’t surprise us. Dividends are, at best, a band-aid solution to carbon pricing’s political woes. They create a debate over whether people want a check to cover their increased energy costs. Yes, some would rather have the check, but most would still prefer cheap energy. |
8. Do M+S know the policy they’re critiquing?
We’ve already noted (in Point 5) how easily carbon pricing is made a flash point. And we appreciate the authors’ relative openness to the “dividend” approach for distributing the revenues from carbon pricing. Alas, their treatment is muddled. We’ve rarely if ever seen reference to “price-and-dividend.” Rather, the guiding idea, popularized since 2009 by Citizens Climate Lobby as “fee and dividend,” is a straight-up levy (which CCL labels a fee) on the carbon content of fossil fuels, with the proceeds distributed to U.S. households in equal amounts (“dividends” or “green checks”). M+S aptly write, “Give the public a green check every month, the thinking goes, and it might just embrace climate policies.” Not just that, increase the size of the green check each year, and the public will buy in further. The expanding check could give lawmakers cover to ramp up the carbon tax rate, allowing it to start gradually at just $15 or $20 per ton but reach triple digits — a level that every economic model predicts will set off big (30-40 percent) emission reductions within a half-dozen years. And the promise of the ramp-up will spur households, planners and entrepreneurs to raise their decarbonization sights, unleashing waves of products and actions — infill development, higher product efficiencies, zero-energy buildings — locking in even larger cuts in fossil fuel use. Contrary to M+S, there’s no need to tailor carbon dividends to benefit poorer households; the policy’s very design does that automatically, by virtue of the pronounced tendency of poorer families to spend less on energy and fuels and richer families to spend more. We’ve lost track of the number of studies documenting that fee-and-dividend would be income-progressive in the aggregate, with few actual households losing ground. Again contrary to the authors, neither Canada nor Switzerland nor any other country has a carbon price with dividend. And why the straw man of burying the green check in other pots of money, when electronic benefit transfers could keep the dividend separate and make it manifest? Last, why the defeatism that most Americans would take cheap energy over the dividend check especially when most households’ green checks would outpace their higher energy expenses? (More on that score here.) And we ask Mildenberger and Stokes to bear in mind: the longer we keep energy cheap, the more time it will take to phase out fossil fuels and the greater the climate damage while we’re doing it. |
This takes us two-thirds of the way through the Mildenberger-Stokes article. The remainder mostly treads the same territory with the same strawmen: The gusher of renewables we need “cannot be achieved through carbon pricing alone.” “The objective should not be getting ‘the prices right.’” “Economists and climate policymakers must ask themselves: is insistence on theoretical efficiency more important than delivering climate stability?”
What are they talking about? Who are they talking to? Maybe because I’m not in academia, I don’t know a soul whose ardor for a carbon tax is driven by its theoretical efficiency. We want to tax carbon emissions because we believe doing so can deliver huge emission reductions fast — and equitably.
Where we do agree is in “breaking fossil fuel companies’ stranglehold on our political system.” And we appreciate the Mildenberger-Stokes argument that “large-scale industrial policy” including establishing and meeting clean energy targets, is the way to do that. That’s the Green New Deal, which CTC has backed from the git-go. But getting the GND rolling to the point where it muscles in on the fossil fuel companies won’t happen overnight — same as carbon pricing.
That carbon pricing doesn’t have the visceral appeal of a program centered on standards, investment and justice doesn’t warrant throwing it overboard. The carbon tax silver bullet may be a dead letter, but carbon taxing needs to live on. Even with millions of us in the streets and majorities in Congress, the Green New Deal will be a huge mountain to climb. Without pricing the climate damage from fossil fuels, getting to the net-zero mountaintop will take an awful lot longer.
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