Search Results for “cap and trade” – Page 30

Some History

This page summarizes some past efforts to increase energy taxes in the U.S.

Clinton Btu Tax (1993)

In 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed a general tax on all energy forms, as part of a broader deficit-reduction plan and also to promote energy conservation. The tax was to be levied on coal, natural gas, liquefied petroleum gases, gasoline, nuclear-generated electricity, hydro-electricity, and imported electricity, at a base rate of 25.7 cents per million Btu, with an additional 34.2 cents per million Btu on refined petroleum products. Opposition was broad-based, ranging from oil companies and farmers to major energy-users such as aluminum corporations and their advocates at the National Association of Manufacturers. The “Transportation Fuels Tax” became law on Oct. 1, 1993, but not as the broad-based tax originally proposed. As enacted, the law imposed an average tax of 13.814 cents per gallon on gasoline, diesel, and special motor fuels. 

An unfortunate legacy of the Btu tax proposal has been to discourage elected officials from seeking higher levies on fuels or even fuel-based emissions. Indeed, as Grist’s Dave Roberts reported, Bill Clinton himself, addressing the National Clean Energy Summit in August 2008, said he supports pricing carbon via a cap-and-trade system because “I tried [a carbon tax] once. It didn’t work for me.” Unfortunately, Clinton’s framing of his Btu tax as a carbon tax is both inaccurate and unhelpful. In his remarks, the former president also missed a chance to draw lessons from the 1993 failure. One is that a tax proposal geared toward a societal outcome (e.g., climate protection) rather than revenue should be revenue-neutral. A second is that the design of the tax should avoid the smorgasbord of exemptions that weighed down the 1993 proposal.

Recently, in a major story that led the NY Times front page on Dec. 5, 2013, the paper’s new climate-beat reporter Coral Davenport picked up Clinton’s meme:

Past efforts to enact a carbon price in Washington have failed largely because powerful fossil-fuel groups financed campaigns against lawmakers who supported a carbon tax. In 1994, dozens of Democratic lawmakers lost their jobs after Al Gore, who was vice president at the time, urged them to vote for a climate change bill that would have effectively taxed carbon pollution. In 2009, President Obama urged House Democrats to vote for a cap-and-trade bill that would have required companies whose carbon-dioxide emissions exceeded set levels to buy emissions rights from those who emitted less. The next year, Tea Party groups spent millions to successfully unseat members who voted for the bill. (emphasis added)

Actually, the Btu tax was promoted as a broad-based environmental measure and a revenue-raiser, and hardly if at all as a climate measure. Moreover, the backlash against it was far from the lone catalyst of the Democrats’ resounding defeat in the 1994 midterm elections. The party was caught short by then-GOP leader Newt Gingrich’s astute political branding (the “Contract for America”) and by the National Rifle Association’s pushback against the federal assault weapons ban enacted earlier that year. As NY Times Sunday Magazine writer Robert Draper noted in his Dec. 15 cover story, Inside the Power of the N.R.A., “[W]hen President Bill Clinton and Congress passed a ban on assault weapons[,] the gun group then targeted the bill’s proponents during the midterm elections. Many of them lost and Republicans became the majority. ‘The N.R.A. is the reason Republicans control the House,’ Clinton ruefully observed.” In short, the idea that a “carbon tax” bill flipped control of the House in 1994 is historical revisionism run amok. (Otherwise, Davenport’s account is solid.)

Minnesota Carbon Tax (mid-1990s)

In the 1990s, energy activists in Minnesota led in part by the Institute for Local Self-Reliance undertook an effort to enact a billion-dollar state “tax shift” to raise energy prices while reducing taxes on income and/or property. The proposal was debated extensively but was never enacted into law. The Institute has archived key documents in support of the initiative, including testimony, fact sheets, economic analyses and draft legislation.

Other State Initiatives

The State Environmental Resource Center compiled brief accounts of past carbon tax initiatives in Minnesota and five other states: CA, MD, OR, TX, VT. Although SERC has ceased operation (its office is now the Wisconsin office for Defenders of Wildlife), their helpful page may still be accessed here.

John Anderson 50-50 Tax (1980)

In August 1979, Rep. John Anderson (IL) called for a 50-cent-per gallon energy conservation tax on motor vehicle fuels to reduce consumption and dependence on foreign oil. He proposed using the revenues from the tax to reduce payroll taxes by 50 percent, increase Social Security benefits, compensate those who were not on a payroll and thus not subject to the payroll tax, exempt farmers and allow tax credits for businesses “unfairly penalized.” (See Anderson’s Campaign Brochure.) In making his proposal, Congressman Anderson was not naive about the politics of proposing a gas tax:

“I am under no illusions regarding the popularity of this tax,” he acknowledged, and went on to state, prophetically, “But higher gasoline taxes in this country are unavoidable. We have no choice. Either we tax ourselves by means of a gasoline tax, or OPEC will tax us in the form of higher and higher prices for crude oil.” (Unfortunately, the Sept. 11, 1979 news clip with this quote is no longer Web-available.)

At that time, of course, the importance of taxing fuels other than gasoline to reduce emissions of CO2 emissions was not yet recognized.

Opinion Polls

September 2021 poll: Record share of Americans are “alarmed” or “concerned” on climate change.

A record one-third of Americans now say they’re “alarmed” about climate change, while another one-quarter call themselves “concerned,” according to Sept 2021 polling by the Yale Program on Climate Communications.

“Today, the Alarmed (33%) outnumber the Dismissive (9%) by more than 3 to 1,” the Yale researchers declared in their latest climate polling report, Global Warming’s Six Americas, September 2021. “About six in ten Americans (59%) are either Alarmed or Concerned, while only about 2 in 10 (19%) are Doubtful or Dismissive,” the researchers noted in their summary of polling conducted last September and released on Jan. 15, 2022.

Chart from Yale-George Mason report, “Global Warming’s Six Americas, September 2021.” Link in text.

The Yale team, with their partners at George Mason University, noted that the “Alarmed” segment had replaced “Concerned” as the dominant opinion group., though “Concerned” is now firmly in second place:

When our surveys began in 2008, the Concerned were the single largest group. By 2010, they were slightly smaller, while the Cautious grew and became about equally as large. By contrast, the Alarmed were the second smallest group as recently as early 2015 (only the Disengaged were smaller), but have grown rapidly to become the largest segment of the U.S. population today. Meanwhile, the Cautious, Doubtful, and Dismissive groups have all gotten smaller in recent years.

The latest Yale-George Mason findings were first reported by Inside Climate News on Jan. 15.

December 2020 poll finds 2/3 of American voters support carbon tax.

Two-thirds of registered voters support making fossil fuel companies pay a carbon tax, according to December 2020 polling released in January 2021.

The poll, part of the roughly-annual survey compiled by the Yale Program on Climate Communications, was published on Jan. 14, 2021 under the rubric, Politics & Global Warming and reported on Jan. 15 in a New York Times story, Survey Finds Majority of Voters Support Initiatives to Fight Climate Change.

The Times story focused on the strong support expressed for solar power, efficient automobiles and clean-energy research. But the 67 percent positive score for “Requiring fossil fuel companies to pay a tax on the carbon pollution they produce, and using that revenue to reduce other taxes (such as the federal income tax) by an equal amount (i.e., a revenue-neutral carbon tax)” was notable as well.

Polling graphic may be viewed on this Yale Climate Communications page.

February 2020: Protecting the environment and tackling climate change have climbed up the list of Americans’ political priorities as economic concerns have faded, according to a new report from Pew Research Center, reports The New York Times.

For the first time in the Pew Research Center survey’s two-decade history, a majority of Americans said dealing with climate change should be a top priority for the president and Congress. That’s a 14 percentage point rise from four years ago. But the surge in climate concern is mostly driven by Democrats. Fewer than 25% of Republicans view climate as a top policy priority.

Graphs and most of caption above are from Feb. 20, 2020 New York Times story, Climate Change Rises as a Public Priority. But It’s More Partisan Than Ever. Here’s more:

Addressing climate change has become more urgent for Democrats in recent years, with 78 percent calling it a top policy priority in 2020. But Republicans have, by and large, remained unmoved. The partisan gap over climate change was the widest to date in 2020 and the most yawning among 18 issues covered by the survey. Protecting the environment, including air and water quality, was the second most divisive issue.

(Note: A more useful characterization than “divisive” or “partisan” may be that on climate, as on virtually all salient issues of the day, Republicans are backward and obstructionist.)

January 2020: Yale Poll reports nearly six in ten (58%) Americans are either “Alarmed” or “Concerned” about global warming. From 2014 to 2019, the proportion of “Alarmed” nearly tripled, making them (31%) the largest of the six opinion blocs.

The graph above and the following text are from the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication:

Our prior research has categorized Americans into six groups, based on their climate change beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The “Alarmed” are the most worried about global warming and the most supportive of strong action to reduce carbon pollution. In contrast, the “Dismissive” do not think global warming is happening or human-caused and strongly oppose climate action.

Our latest survey (November 2019) finds that the Alarmed segment is at an all-time high (31%). The Alarmed segment has nearly tripled in size since October 2014. Conversely, the Dismissive (10%) and Doubtful (10%) segments have each decreased over the past five years. The proportion of Americans in these two segments combined has decreased by about five percentage points since 2014.

The new opinion data are from surveys conducted during November 2019, before the onset of the apocalyptic Australia climate-driven fires that have drawn widespread attention in the U.S. and elsewhere.

For those who prefer the opinion results in snapshot form rather than time series, the Yale people included this unmistakable chart:

August 2018: Yale Maps of Public Opinion on Climate Change and Policy

The Yale Program on Climate Change Communication is out with a remarkable series of maps summarizing Americans’ opinions on climate change. By county, metro area, state, congressional district or the U.S. as a whole, the Yale Climate Opinion Maps present views on a broad spectrum of climate questions and issues.

The map above is just one of several hundred that may be viewed and downloaded from the Yale web site.

Note that the link in the prior paragraphs goes to a different map than the one at right. The interactive menu lets you move among more than two dozen survey questions collated at five different geographical levels and showing either absolute percentages or deviations from the national norm.

We’re still digesting the survey methodology and findings. Come back to this page soon for more commentary, but be sure to go to the Yale site and take your own tour.

June 2017 Poll: Climate Change Now “Extremely or Very Important” to Majority of Americans

Graphic from NORC-AP poll released 6-16-2017 (annotation by CTC).

The widely respected National Opinion Research Center – Associated Press polling collaborative issued its latest poll results late Friday, June 16. While the NORC-AP press release led with Pres. Trump’s abysmal (64%) disapproval rating, a potentially more significant result was the one highlighted in the graph at left.

Fifty-three percent of people polled called climate change “extremely or very important.” This may be the first time a majority of U.S. respondents assigned climate change such a high level of concern. Indeed, climate is often viewed in political circles as a “low-salience” issue, one that people profess to care about but don’t act on via political channels. That may be changing, though it may also be that the rating was pushed up in this poll by asking respondents to specifically rate climate change (and other issues) rather than elicit, say, “the three most critical issues to you and your family.”

If this result indicates genuine public sentiment, it could translate into repudiation of climate-denying and climate-ignoring candidates in the 2018 Congressional primaries and elections. It may also portend and provoke more members of Congress to endorse the Citizens’ Climate Lobby’s Republican Climate Resolution or take similar steps diverging from G.O.P. anti-climate orthodoxy.

The full NORC-AP poll may be downloaded here. Go to p. 4 for a breakout of the climate change responses.

Earlier Polls (March 2017)

“Global Warming Concern at Three-Decade High in US,” the Gallup Organization pronounced in a March 2017 news release. “Americans are increasingly warming to the idea of a carbon tax,” reported the National Survey on Energy and Environment (NSEE) from the University of Michigan and Muhlenberg College, one day later.

Support for carbon taxes registered 14 points higher than in prior surveys, with strong support now at 25%, more than double its prior high. Source: NEES poll, Fall 2016 (see text).

The findings from NSEE are especially significant. First, their poll, from Fall 2016, just before the elections, concerned carbon taxing specifically rather than climate change generally. Second, this was their fifth survey with that question, going back to 2009, allowing comparisons over time. The graph at left makes the rising support crystal clear.

Here’s how the NSEE researchers summarized the poll results:

The results from the latest round of the NSEE, fielded in the weeks just prior to the November 2016 elections, show that support for carbon taxes appears to have increased significantly compared to earlier iterations of the survey. Respondents were asked four previous times over the last seven years whether they would support “a tax to reduce greenhouse gases by taxing fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas.” On each of these earlier rounds, support never registered above 36%. In the Fall 2016 survey, however, half (50%) of Americans expressed support for a carbon tax, and strong support for the tax is more than twice as high as any previous round of the survey. (emphasis added)

The survey [found that] support for a carbon tax has substantially increased across the political spectrum from when the question was last asked in Spring 2014. Support this fall was 66% among Democrats (a 29 percentage point increase from Spring 2014), 30% among Republicans (a 15 percentage point increase), and 47% among Independents (a 9 percentage point increase).

The NSEE opinion researchers also found that support for a revenue-neutral carbon tax exceeded that for a generic carbon tax for which revenue use was unspecified. While this may not reflect a preference for revenue-neutrality as much as revenue salience (since the question may have tipped off the interviewees that revenues are part of the carbon tax equation), it suggests that proponents of revenue-neutral approaches such as Citizens Climate Lobby and the Climate Leadership Council have their fingers closer to the public pulse than do economists who prefer tax swaps as the means to a revenue-neutral carbon tax.

Support for a revenue-neutral carbon tax (with revenues returned as income-tax cuts) exceeds that for a carbon tax with no revenue use details, especially among independents and Republicans. Source: NSEE poll (see text).

Even newer is the poll conducted in March 2017, by Gallup, with results shown at right. Most significant, perhaps is the rise to 45% in the number of respondents who “worry a great deal about global warming.” The 45% figure is up from 37% a year ago and well above the recent low point of 25% in 2011. Worry — anxiety, fear, upset — is more easily translated into political preference and action than is mere belief.

These findings led Gallup to proclaim “global warming concern at three-decade high.”

According to Gallup, the 45% figure for “worry a great deal” about global warming is the highest ever, besting the previous top figure of 41%, recorded in 2007 — a couple of years before the hydra-headed Koch Brothers-funded front groups unleashed their “the science isn’t settled” assault on the broad scientific consensus that climate change is real, human-caused and dangerous. The lost decade will haunt humanity and Earth’s other living beings for centuries, perhaps forever; but it appears that American public opinion may have climbed back from the denialist-made abyss.

Self-declared Independents showed the biggest rise when Gallup asked, “Do you worry a great deal about global warming.”

Unfortunately, this rebound in polling has not occurred across the political spectrum, according to a companion post from Gallup, Democrats Drive Rise in Concern About Global Warming. Actually, that headline appears to be misdirected; as the Gallup graphic at left shows, the striking rise in concern (as measured in responses to the worry a great deal” question) is most evident in independents, who registered 45% on that score in March, up from 30% several years ago. Democrats who say they worry a great deal also increased, to 66% from 56%, but Republicans hardly budged, polling at just 18%, barely up from 16% a few years back.

Polls from 2016 or earlier

Three polls from early 2015 and much of 2016 heralded the very strong poll findings reported above.

In January 2015, political scientists at Stanford University and Resources for the Future who for years have been polling Americans on climate concern and policy commissioned the polling firm SSRS to interview 1,023 U.S. adults on climate-related issues. Perhaps because CTC had been beseeching the lead Stanford researcher (Jon Krosnick), or maybe because the time was finally ripe, SSRS included questions designed to take Americans’ temperature on revenue-neutral carbon taxes. (We had explained the need for carbon-tax polling to incorporate the option of returning revenues to households; otherwise, the tax would appear as all stick and no carrot.)

The most carbon-tax-positive datapoint yet.

In 2015 we called this the most carbon-tax-positive datapoint yet.

The results, released in April 2015 (pdf), showed that two-thirds of Americans support making corporations pay a price for carbon pollution, provided the revenues are redistributed, i.e., made revenue-neutral. At the time, we called the finding the most powerful indication yet that the public is warming to carbon taxation as the premier policy for combating climate change.

Those findings were buttressed by a poll of more than 1,000 voters conducted close after the 2016 elections, between Nov. 18 and Dec. 1. The “Politics and Global Warming” poll performed by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication found that:

“Two in three registered voters (66%) support requiring fossil fuel companies to pay a carbon tax and using the money to reduce other taxes (such as income tax) by an equal amount – a plan often referred to as a ‘revenue neutral carbon tax.’ 81% of Democrats, 60% of Independents, and 49% of Republicans support this policy.”

Full Yale poll here, Yale summary here, CNBC article here (“Nearly half of Republicans favor this kind of carbon tax, contrary to GOP platform”). A related publication, Climate Change in the American Mind, contains revealing details on the evolution of climate concern (but not on  carbon taxes or other possible policy responses) among Americans since 2008.

SimilarlyGallup _ U.S. Concern About Global Warming at Eight-Year High _ annotated _ 18 March 2016, in March 2016, nearly two-thirds (64%) of American adults told Gallup’s annual environmental poll that they were worried a “great deal” or a “fair amount” about global warming. That figure was up from 55% in March 2015 and was the highest reading since 2008, according to Gallup. (See graphic at right.)

Other results from the 2016 Gallup poll were equally striking. They showed a record-high share of Americans stating that climate change poses a threat to them and their way of life; a record number agreeing that climate change is caused primarily by human activity; and climate concern climbing across the political spectrum: on the left, center and right.

Other Opinion Polling

  • Support for action to combat global warming is growing among younger Republican-leaning voters. (Washington Post poll, November 2014.)
  • Three fourths of Republicans support expanded support for renewable energy; only about 1/3 would support a candidate who says climate science is “too unclear” for government to take action. (“Republicans, Clean Energy and Climate Change,” Clear Path Survey, 2015.)
  • 70% of Democrats and 51% of Republicans would support a carbon tax to fund research and development of renewable energy.  Slightly less, 65% of Democrats and 43% of Republicans, would support a carbon tax whose revenue was returned via a “dividend” check. (“Public Views on a Carbon Tax Depend on the Proposed Use of Revenue,” NSEE Survey, 2014.)
  • One in five respondents to a 2016 Guardian solicitation to readers named climate change as the “one issue that affects your life you wish the presidential candidates were discussing more.” While this sample was explicitly non-random, climate change’s #1 standing in the poll belies the prevailing notion that it doesn’t resonate strongly with U.S. voters. (Climate change: the missing issue of the 2016 campaign, July 5, 2016.)
  • Alas, some pollsters have yet to figure out how to pose unbiased questions about carbon taxes. In a Sept 2016 poll promoted by the Associated Press, the NORC Center for Public Affairs Research and the U-Chicago Energy Policy Institute asked whether people were willing to pay more for electricity to combat change (Poll: Americans Favor Slightly Higher Bills to Fight Warming). Because the question didn’t mention dividends or other ways in which the proceeds could benefit households, the results were tepid: “If the cost of fighting climate change is only an additional $1 a month, 57 percent of Americans said they would support that. But as that fee goes up, support for it plummets. At $10 a month, 39 percent were in favor and 61 percent opposed.”

Older Surveys

Polling the American Public on Climate Change (April 2013), by the Environmental & Energy Study Institute offers comprehensive data on U.S. public opinion on climate change. It deftly graphs the ups-and-downs of public opinion since 2006 as registered in half-a-dozen leading surveys, and summarizes (with links) 20 different climate polls from 2012 and 2013 — all in just four pages.

Yale Project on Climate Change Communication (Public Support for Climate and Energy Policies, Nov. 2013) reported that:

      • 83% of Americans say the U.S. should make an effort to reduce global warming, even if it has economic costs.
      • 65% say that corporations and industry, 61% say that citizens themselves, and 52% say the U.S. Congress should be doing more to address global warming.
      • 71% say global warming should be a “very high”, “high”, or “medium” priority for the president and Congress.
      • 67% of Democrats and 52% of Republicans support eliminating all subsidies for the fossil-fuel industry.

National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change (Brookings, April 2011) polled and compared the perceptions and preferences of 916 residents of the United States with those of 1214 Canadians. Brookings found that 56% of Americans supported national cap-and-trade while 46% supported higher fossil fuel taxes. In Canada, the figures were 63% for cap-and-trade and 58% for fossil fuel taxes, respectively.

Hart – U.S. Climate Task Force (December 2009) survey of 1,002 adults found that of those who supported action to address global warming, 58% supported a tax on carbon emissions that created incentives to reduce emissions and increase efficiency and provided tax refunds to individuals and households to offset the overall impact of the carbon tax. This compared to 27% who preferred a cap-and-trade option setting an overall limit on emissions, allowing companies to buy and sell permits.

The difference between the Hart results and those of the Brookings and Yale surveys may be explained in part by the more detailed explanations of the policies offered in the Hart poll. This suggests that clear articulation of the benefits of a carbon tax (and the options for revenue return) could result in majority support, at least among those willing to support action to mitigate global warming.

Where Carbon Is Taxed (Overview)

This page summarizes the status of carbon pricing, worldwide. (For a look at carbon pricing in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Chile and Sweden, see Where Carbon Is Taxed (Specific Countries). Carbon taxing/pricing in Canada, including British Columbia, has its own page.) The last section of this page shows graphically the world’s 20 largest carbon-emitting countries.

Carbon pricing (a rubric that includes emissions trading systems as well as direct carbon taxing) presents the classic glass half-empty, glass half-full picture.

Glass Half-Empty: A dour view of carbon pricing programs

The half-empty glass is represented by the chart at left, below, adapted by Princeton energy modeler-researcher Jesse Jenkins, from World Bank data. It indicates that just 1 in 7 molecularly equivalent greenhouse gases (GHG’s) are priced, with just 1 in 14 priced at or above $15 per metric ton of CO2 equivalent — a largely token level. The stunted top two bars show that just 1 in 200 emission units are priced at or above $40 per tonne, a rough cutoff between somewhat-effective and largely symbolic pricing of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.

Readers are urged to view or download the World Bank’s latest (2020) State and Trends of Carbon Pricing report, for its comprehensive overview on carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems in place or under consideration around the world, along with national and subnational particulars.

Please also note Carbon Brief’s Paris climate pledge tracker, an on-line spreadsheet that summarized 190 nations’ INDC’s (individual nationally-determined commitments) that constitute the Paris climate agreement. Unfortunately, the data appear frozen in 2015.

Glass Half-Full: An upbeat view of carbon pricing programs

The three graphics directly below, from the World Bank’s 2020 State and Trends report (see link, two paragraphs up), seek to cast actual and prospective carbon pricing programs in an upbeat light:

Figure 1: Summary map of existing, emerging and potential regional, national and subnational carbon pricing initiatives (ETS and tax)

The next World Bank graph shows each program’s carbon price:

Figure 3: Prices in existing carbon pricing initiatives

The third and final World Bank graph ingeniously but perhaps over-optimistically depicts the growing cumulative share of global CO2 emissions “covered” by carbon pricing policies:

Figure 2: Regional, national and subnational carbon pricing initiatives: share of global GHG emissions covered

As noted, there’s rich detail in the World Bank report. Here’s the link again.

Which Countries Are the Largest Carbon-Emitters?

In case you were wondering:

Resources

Can We Price Carbon, a 2018 M.I.T. Press book by U-Michigan economics professor Barry Rabe, is “the most balanced look to date into the complex realities of carbon pricing,” says the renowned Resources for the Future scholar, Dallas Burtraw. “Rabe provides an essential starting point for serious thinking about how to make progress on climate policy. This book is a triumph.”.

Making Climate Policy Work, a 2020 book from Polity Books and Wiley, by Danny Cullenward and David G. Victor, casts a more critical eye at carbon taxing and other pricing schemes. The publisher’s page says it “shows how the politics of creating and maintaining market-based policies render them ineffective nearly everywhere they have been applied. Facing that reality requires relying more heavily on smart regulation and industrial policy – government-led strategies – to catalyze the transformation that markets promise, but rarely deliver.”

The Reality Of Carbon Taxes In The 21st Century, a 2009 book by a team at Vermont Law School’s Environmental Tax Policy Institute headed by environmental-taxation scholar Janet E. Milne, is a good snapshot of the more optimistic view prevalent at that time. The entire 114-page book may be downloaded here.

We invite visitors to this site to read these works and share their observations with us.

Dividends

Carbon Dividends (“Green Checks”)

Another approach for handling carbon-tax revenues, one that is clearly income-progressive and appealingly straightforward, is to return the revenues equally to all U.S. residents. This  so-called “dividend” would be a national version of the Alaska Permanent Fund, which since the 1970s has annually sent all state residents identical checks drawn from earnings on investments made with the state’s North Slope oil royalties. (For a federal carbon tax, the “dividend” checks should be provided quarterly or monthly to keep households ahead of the budget treadmill.)

The dividend approach was so attractive and elegant that the nation’s (and perhaps the world’s) most energetic and active advocacy organization for carbon taxes has organized around it. That’s the Citizens’ Climate Lobby, which calls its approach carbon fee-and-dividend.

Fee-and-dividend explained, Canadian style. Hat tip to @scottsantens.

Fee-and-dividend explained, Canadian style. Hat tip to @scottsantens.

Nevertheless, it seems fair to say (and important to acknowledge) that by 2018, the second year of the Trump administration, fee-and-dividend has run out of political room. Not a single “sitting” (i.e., still in office) Republican member of Congress has publicly endorsed fee-and-dividend, even as a concept, let alone an actual bill. Yet the premise of fee-and-dividend has always been bipartisanship, since Democrats, with their preference for activist government, would accept a revenue-neutral carbon tax such as fee-and-dividend only if it delivered Republican votes.

For a decade, we wrote glowingly about fee and dividend — most recently in 2017 articles in The Nation and the Washington Spectator. We also praised the Climate Leadership Council’s “carbon dividend” proposal and advocacy in those two pieces and in numerous blogs (herehere, and hereinter alia). But as we wrote in June 2018, we believe that the time for carbon dividend proposals has probably passed. We wrote:

The [political] center to which Baker-Shultz (CLC) and fee-and-dividend (CCL) were designed to appeal barely exists. It’s not just that no sitting Republican has endorsed Baker-Shultz or indeed fee-and-dividend in any form. It’s also that the Democratic majority that will be needed to pass a carbon tax bill appears unlikely to rally around a revenue-neutral carbon tax, whether it’s organized as fee-and-dividend or some form of tax swap.

Economic Progressivity of Fee-and-Dividend

In 2016 CCL released a detailed paper examining how a carbon fee-and-dividend would impact U.S. households. The study took into account geographic variations in electricity sources and gasoline use and drew on a database of carbon intensity of expenditures for 5.8 million households to analyze the net effect of returning revenue to households on a modified per capita basis. Here are the major results:

Percentage of Households Benefitted by Income Quintile

Percentage of Households Benefitted, by Income Quintile

  • 53% of households (and 58% of individuals) would receive more in dividend payments than they would spend due to higher fossil fuel prices.
  • Another 19% of households would incur only a slight loss, defined as a net loss no larger than one-fifth of one percent of pre-tax income.
  • Nearly 90% of households below the poverty line would benefit an average of $311, an increase of roughly 2.8% of pre-tax income.
  • In contrast, the net loss for the top quintile of households would average $-322 or only -0.18% of pre-tax income.

Notably, these findings support a dividend plan’s ability to transform a carbon tax into a progressive policy that neutralizes the burden that lower-income households would otherwise face, directly and indirectly, due to higher fuel prices. CTC advocates a progressive distributional outcome for both pragmatic and ethical reasons: pragmatically, because a carbon tax will require broad, sustained, public and political support; and ethically, because it’s not tenable to solve the climate crisis on the backs of those who can least afford it.

A Caveat — CBO’s “haircut”

The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office routinely “scores” members’ bills for their prospective impact on tax revenues. To streamline its analyses, CBO long ago settled the so-called “CBO haircut” by which it assumes that one-quarter of indirectly raised revenues would need to be allocated from the tax proceeds in question in order to make up for reduced tax revenues collected from conventional sources such as personal or corporate income taxes. But modeling of carbon tax proposals consistently finds that when revenue is strategically returned by reducing other taxes that tend to slow down economic activity, the net negative impacts are much lower than CBO’s 25% assumption and in some cases may be eliminated altogether. While returning revenue as “dividends” (which economists call “lump-sum rebates”) offers less potential to reduce economic drag than tax shifts, CBO’s assumption still seems like an over-estimate.

In any event, rigid application of the 25% CBO haircut could, on paper at least — and, likely, in Congressional deliberations — limit the carbon tax revenue perceived to be available for “dividends” to 75%. Yet even with this reduced fraction of revenue, returning carbon tax revenue via a direct dividend represents a simple and income-progressive means to make carbon taxes distributionally fair; though with the haircut, the share of households reaping a net benefit via an equal 75% dividend would be lower than the 58% of individuals mentioned above.

Related CTC blog posts:

Related news reports and opinion pieces: