Enviro’s Dreaming Imaginary Ladders (Grist, Ken Ward)
G-8 Failure Reflects U.S. Failure on Climate Change
Guest Post by Jim Hansen
Jim Hansen is director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, but he writes on this policy-related topic as a private citizen. This post first appeared on Huffington Post on July 9.
It didn’t take long for the counterfeit climate bill known as Waxman-Markey to push back against President Obama’s agenda. As the president was arriving in Italy for his first Group of Eight summit, the New York Times was reporting that efforts to close ranks on global warming between the G-8 and the emerging economies had already tanked:
The world’s major industrial nations and emerging powers failed to agree Wednesday on significant cuts in heat-trapping gases by 2050, unraveling an effort to build a global consensus to fight climate change, according to people following the talks.
Of course, emission targets in 2050 have limited practical meaning — present leaders will be dead or doddering by then — so these differences may be patched up. The important point is that other nations are unlikely to make real concessions on emissions if the United States is not addressing the climate matter seriously.
With a workable climate bill in his pocket, President Obama might have been able to begin building that global consensus in Italy. Instead, it looks as if the delegates from other nations may have done what 219 U.S. House members who voted up Waxman-Markey last month did not: critically read the 1,400-page American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 and deduce that it’s no more fit to rescue our climate than a V-2 rocket was to land a man on the moon.
I share that conclusion, and have explained why to members of Congress before and will again at a Capitol Hill briefing on July 13. Science has exposed the climate threat and revealed this inconvenient truth: If we burn even half of Earth’s remaining fossil fuels we will destroy the planet as humanity knows it. The added emissions of heat-trapping carbon dioxide will set our Earth irreversibly onto a course toward an ice-free state, a course that will initiate a chain reaction of irreversible and catastrophic climate changes.
The concentration of CO2 in our atmosphere now stands at 387 parts per million, the highest level in 600,000 years and more than 100 ppm higher than the amount at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Burning just the oil and gas sitting in known fields will drive atmospheric CO2 well over 400 ppm and ignite a devil’s cauldron of melted icecaps, bubbling permafrost, and combustible forests from which there will be no turning back. But if we cut off the largest source of carbon dioxide, coal, we have a chance to bring CO2 back to 350 ppm and still lower through agricultural and forestry practices that increase carbon storage in trees and soil.
The essential step, then, is to phase out coal emissions over the next two decades. And to declare off limits artificial high-carbon fuels such as tar sands and shale while moving to phase out dependence on conventional petroleum as well.
This requires nothing less than an energy revolution based on efficiency and carbon-free energy sources. Alas, we won’t get there with the Waxman-Markey bill, a monstrous absurdity hatched in Washington after energetic insemination by special interests.
For all its “green” aura, Waxman-Markey locks in fossil fuel business-as-usual and garlands it with a Ponzi-like “cap-and-trade” scheme. Here are a few of the bill’s egregious flaws:
- It guts the Clean Air Act, removing EPA’s ability to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants.
- It sets meager targets — 2020 emissions are to be a paltry 13% less than this year’s level — and sabotages even these by permitting fictitious “offsets,” by which other nations are paid to preserve forests — while logging and food production will simply move elsewhere to meet market demand.
- Its cap-and-trade system, reports former U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs Robert Shapiro, “has no provisions to prevent insider trading by utilities and energy companies or a financial meltdown from speculators trading frantically in the permits and their derivatives.”
- It fails to set predictable prices for carbon, without which, Shapiro notes, “businesses and households won’t be able to calculate whether developing and using less carbon-intensive energy and technologies makes economic sense,” thus ensuring that millions of carbon-critical decisions fall short.
There is an alternative, of course, and that is a carbon fee, applied at the source (mine or port of entry) that rises continually. I prefer the “fee-and-dividend” version of this approach in which all revenues are returned to the public on an equal, per capita basis, so those with below-average carbon footprints come out ahead.
A carbon fee-and-dividend would be an economic stimulus and boon for the public. By the time the fee reached the equivalent of $1/gallon of gasoline ($115/ton of CO2) the rebate in the United States would be $2000-3000 per adult or $6000-9000 for a family with two children.
Fee-and-dividend would work hand-in-glove with new building, appliance, and vehicle efficiency standards. A rising carbon fee is the best enforcement mechanism for building standards, and it provides an incentive to move to ever higher energy efficiencies and carbon-free energy sources. As engineering and cultural tipping points are reached, the phase-over to post-fossil energy sources will accelerate. Tar sands and shale would be dead and there would be no need to drill Earth’s pristine extremes for the last drops of oil.
Some leaders of big environmental organizations have said I’m naive to posit an alternative to cap-and-trade, and have suggested I stick to climate modeling. Let’s pass a bill, any bill, now and improve it later, they say. The real naivete is their belief that they, and not the fossil-fuel interests, are driving the legislative process.
The fact is that the climate course set by Waxman-Markey is a disaster course. Their bill is an astoundingly inefficient way to get a tiny reduction of emissions. It’s less than worthless, because it will delay by at least a decade starting on a path that is fundamentally sound from the standpoints of both economics and climate preservation.
Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who died this week, suffered for 40 years — as did our country — from his failure to turn back from a failed policy. As grave as the blunders of the Vietnam War were, the consequences of a failed climate policy will be more severe by orders of magnitude.
With the Senate debate over climate now beginning, there is still time to turn back from cap-and-trade and toward fee-and-dividend. We need to start now. Without political leadership creating a truly viable policy like a carbon fee, not only won’t we get meaningful climate legislation through the Senate, we won’t be able to create the concerted approach we need globally to prevent catastrophic climate change.
Photo: Flickr / World Development Movement.
G-8 Non-Event: Leaders Back 2-Degree (C) Limit
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The Big Four of Accounting Will Be Among the Big Winners if U.S. Adopts Climate Law
How Can the Climate Bill Get to 60 Votes?
Senate panel to kick off climate hearings on Tuesday
Back to Plan A: The Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax
“If we can design a policy that is transparent and easy for people 
to understand, puts an effective price on carbon, and reimburses average Americans for all or nearly all of their increased energy costs, we have a chance to reverse climate change in a timely manner.” So concludes political scientist Elaine Kamarck, PhD, lecturer in public policy at the Kennedy School of Government, and former head of the national performance review “reinventing government” (1993-97) in the Clinton Administration.
Kamarck’s new paper, “Addressing Climate Change: The Politics of the Policy Options,” begins by reviewing three decades of evolving public consciousness about global warming. She reminds us that cap-and-trade didn’t start as the front runner. In his 1992 book “Earth in the Balance,” Al Gore proposed a carbon tax with revenue used to reduce other taxes, an approach backed by most economists and policy analysts. But two events changed this; the apparent success of the acid rain (SO2) cap-and-trade program written into the 1990 Clean Air Act, and the political failure of Clinton’s BTU tax.
Kamarck points out the key factors behind the success of the acid rain cap-and-trade program: only a few hundred sources had to be “capped,” SO2 scrubber technology was readily available, and deregulation of rail freight prices slashed the cost of western low-sulfur coal. She notes that these factors don’t apply to carbon emissions. Curbing CO2 will require a vast array of new technologies at both the energy production and user levels, along with widespread behavioral changes. Beyond the technology differences, the number of entities regulated in a carbon control system would be many times larger than for acid rain.
Kamarck concludes that policymakers have taken the wrong lesson from the failure of the BTU tax proposal. The measure was complex, for example, taxing gasoline at a higher rate than other fossil fuels without a clear rationale. Policymakers could not answer basic questions about its effect, specifically about its cost to consumers. Kamarck says politicians incorrectly concluded they couldn’t touch tax policy; in fact, we generally accept the idea of “sin” taxes, for example on cigarettes, as both good health policy and an appropriate way to generate revenue.
Complexity, exceptions and inability to demonstrate effectiveness are very serious political disadvantages of cap-and-trade that began to surface as the Lieberman-Warner bill failed in the Senate. Kamarck observes that these drawbacks are becoming even more glaring as the Waxman-Markey bill works its way through the legislative process. Whereas politicians must be able to answer constituents’ question What will this cost me?, the complexity of cap-and-trade invites opponents to make outrageous claims about the cost that are almost impossible to persuasively refute. Moreover, in the wake of the collapse of the financial system, the public is extremely wary of trading systems that appear capable of wreaking financial havoc.
The public is also properly skeptical about a policy whose effectiveness requires the rest of the world to follow suit. Since cap-and-trade systems depend on well-developed regulatory and enforcement systems that are far beyond the capacity of many governments, the prospects for an international system based on cap-and-trade are tenuous, Kamarck concludes. In contrast, most nations have a reasonably effective tax collection system that could be used to administer a carbon tax.
Under any carbon pricing system, revenue recycling is essential, Kamarck concludes, not just for the poorest quintile as Waxman-Markey provides, but for virtually everyone, in order to put the policy on a broad political footing. She refutes cap-and-trade architect Robert Stavins’ assertion that giveaways of allowances don’t affect the integrity or effectiveness of an emissions cap. She cites the European Union’s experience where emitters overestimated past emissions to garner more free allowances which led to a very loose cap. That, in turn, brought about virtually negligible carbon prices with virtually no effect on emissions. Indeed, investment in new coal-fired power plants has increased in the EU, a sign that investors expect carbon permit prices to remain low.
Don’t assume that Waxman-Markey can be made effective, fair and transparent enough to be enacted, Kamarck warns. She suggests we start now to work out an effective system under which we can answer the question How much will it cost? with enough certainty to win enactment. Her, and our “Plan B” is, of course, a revenue-neutral carbon tax which as she points out was the original “Plan A.”