- “Cap and trade delivers a sure environmental outcome.” [What "environmental outcome"? Avoidance of catastrophic climate change? Why is there no need to motivate emission reductions faster or further than predetermined cap levels, especially when there are so many opportunities for low-cost and even negative-cost reductions?]

- “Cap-and-trade programs can readily be linked to establish a single comparable global carbon market.” [Yes, and that linkage is what makes ACES so unwieldy, complex, and politically vulnerable. A broad-based, economy-wide regulatory system engenders "broad-based, economy-wide" political opposition.]

- “Cap and trade automatically adjusts to economic conditions.” [Indeed; the adjustment mechanism is extreme price volatility. Considering the kind of price erosion and collapse that has occurred with prior trading systems, Congress would have to constantly adjust a carbon tax downward to achieve the same effect.]

- “Cap and trade with cost containment narrows price uncertainty.” [Yes; cap-and-trade with a price floor and ceiling, both set to the same level, would have zero price uncertainty -- just don't call it a "tax".]

- “Cap and trade provides an effective mechanism for long-range planning.” [Perhaps, if we planning nothing more than meeting the predetermined targets.]

- “Cap and trade delivers its environmental outcome at the lowest cost to the economy as a whole.” [The "environmental outcome" depends on atmospheric GHG concentration levels -- not emission levels. By favoring near-term cost reductions over further emission reductions, future GHG emission targets would need to be lowered -- perhaps to negative levels -- to achieve an adequate GHG concentration target. The high cost of much steeper, and deeper, future emission reductions could dwarf any near-term cost benefit of procrastination.]

- “Cap and trade is not inherently more complex than a carbon tax and indeed has implementation advantages.” [An economy-wide anything would be inherently more complex than sectoral carbon pricing regulations. The adoption of price acceptability -- rather than price minimization -- as a policy goal would eliminate the rationale for, and attendant complexities of, economy-wide linkage.]

The USCAP’s logic-defying policy reasoning is what governs U.S. legislative policy today. Will any kind of coalition for a “Plan B” alternative to cap-and-trade emerge that has a broad-based political backing on par with USCAP, and which is grounded on a clearly-articulated, rational and coherent policy foundation?